

COMMON SENSE ADDRESSES,

TO THE
CITIZENS
OF THE
Southern States:

PROVING,

- I. That the restrictive system is not abandoned by Great Britain or the continental powers.
- II. That there is no just foundation for the threats of retaliation by the European nations for our increase of duties
- III. That the protection of manufactures by duties is constitutional.
- IV. That high prohibitory duties, generally reduce prices and improve quality.
- V. That the distress of the southern States primarily arose from the policy pursued by this government from 1816 to 1824, from the effects of which they have not recovered.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED, FIVE APPENDIXES.

1. The irresistible arguments of Judge Cooper in favour of the protecting system.
2. The ruinous consequences to Russia of the liberal system, as stated by the emperor Alexander.
3. The case of Holland similar to that of Russia.
4. Report of the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives of the United States, in favour of protecting duties.
5. The speech of vice president Calhoun, in favour of the protecting system, and of internal improvement.

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“Cherish a cordial, habitual and immoveable attachment to the union; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any part of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.”—General Washington's Farewell Address.

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THIRD EDITION, ENLARGED AND IMPROVED.

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BY A CITIZEN OF PHILADELPHIA.
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PHILADELPHIA:

Printed by Clark & Raser, 33 Carter's Alley.

Nov. 2, 1829.

J. Ashmun

"Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing nations, a similar policy on the part of the United States, in every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of endeavouring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity of advantages."—*Hamilton's Report on Manufactures*, p. 80.

"Whatever tends to diminish in any country the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the most important of all markets for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still further to discourage agriculture."—*Smith's Wealth of Nations*, Vol. II 149.

"Manufacturing establishments not only occasion a positive augmentation of the produce and revenue of the society, but contribute essentially to rendering them greater than they could possibly be without such establishments."—*Hamilton's Report on Manufactures*, p. 25.

"The substitution of foreign for domestic manufactures is a transfer to foreign nations of the advantages accruing from the employment of machinery, in the modes in which it is capable of being employed with most utility and to the greatest extent."—*Idem*, p. 23.

"Manufacturing establishments afford occasional and extra employment to industrious individuals and families, who are willing to devote the leisure resulting from the intermission of their ordinary pursuits, to collateral labours, as a resource for multiplying their acquisitions or their enjoyments. The husbandman himself experiences a new source of profit and support from the increased industry of his wife and daughters; invited and stimulated by the demands of the neighbouring manufactories.

"Another advantage is the employment of persons who would otherwise be idle, (and in many cases a burden on the community,) either from the bias of temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other cause, indisposing or disqualifying them for the toils of the country."—*Idem*, p. 29.

"Let us not deceive ourselves by false appearances. A nation may carry on a gainful trade, while its strength and vigour are declining. Its merchants may be enriched, while the state becomes nerveless and exhausted."—*Anderson on National Industry*, p. 288.

"Women and children are rendered more useful, and the latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they would otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that four-sevenths nearly are women and children; of whom the greatest proportion are children, and many of them of a very tender age."—*Hamilton's Report on Manufactures*, p. 29.

"No earthly method remains for encouraging agriculture, where it has not reared up its head, that can be considered in any way efficacious, but the establishing proper manufactures in those countries you wish to encourage."—*Anderson on Industry*, p. 70.

"If a manufacture be established in any rich and fertile country, by convening a number of people into one place, who must all be fed by the farmer, without interfering with any of his necessary operations, they establish a ready market for the produce of his farm, and thus throw money into his hands, and give spirit and energy to his culture."—*Idem*, 37.

"There are natural causes tending to render the external demand for the surplus of agricultural nations a precarious reliance. The differences of seasons, in the countries which are the consumers, make immense differences in the produce of their own soils, in different years; and consequently in the degrees of their necessity for foreign supply. Plentiful harvests with them, especially if similar ones occur at the same time, in the countries which are the furnishers, occasion of course a glut in the markets of the latter."—*Hamilton's Report on Manufactures*, p. 35.

"There appear strong reasons to regard the foreign demand for our surplus produce as too uncertain a reliance, and to desire a substitute for it, in an extensive domestic market."—*Ibid*.

"If Europe will not take from us the products of our soil, upon terms consistent with our interest, the natural remedy is to contract, as fast as possible, our wants of her."—*Idem*, 40.

PREFACE.

THIS pamphlet, of which the first edition, in separate numbers, made its appearance in May and June, 1828, was written with the sanguine hope of allaying a portion of the extreme irritation and effervescence that prevailed to the south, arising, as the writer conscientiously believes, from misconception of the constitutional powers of Congress, and the effects of high protecting duties—and he flatters himself into the belief, that, from the cogency of the facts it contains, and the fairness of the arguments founded on them, had it been as extensively circulated as the inflammatory calls to “*resistance*”—to “*standing to arms*”—to “*acting the scenes of our revolution over again*”—and the numberless other appeals to all the hostile, angry passions, have been, it would have quieted the fears and alarms of such of our southern citizens as have their minds open to conviction.

It is extraordinary that the constitutionality of the power of Congress to protect manufactures should, at this late period, be so steadily denied and so ardently opposed, notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal recognition of it, by the first Congress, and the uniform practice of government, without the slightest objection, for above thirty years*—notwithstanding, also, the recommendation of it by General Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Alexander Hamilton, William Lowndes, John C. Calhoun†—and many other citizens of the highest standing in the country, as may be seen, *infra* pp. 13, 14, 15.‡

And on what ground is the power denied? Because, as I have stated, p. 12, a motion made in the Federal Convention, to

* The constitutionality of the protection of manufactures was first objected to about six or eight years since.

† Mr. Calhoun's speech, in favour of the protecting system, in 1816, contains an array of strong facts and conclusive deductions from them. See Appendix, E.

‡ In Appendix, A, the reader may see the powerful arguments in favour of the protecting system by Judge Cooper, who has been the grand-leader of the opposition to it for two or three years past.

authorize Congress to encourage manufactures by "*bounties*," was rejected. And according to Mr. James Hamilton, who, I believe, first broached this doctrine, a "*protecting duty*" is "*a bounty!!!*" Is not this special pleading, or something very analogous?

Mr. Jefferson's name is brought forward as a tower of strength against the doctrine. But Mr. Jefferson, in the prime of life, when his faculties were in their full vigour, recommended manufactures to the "protection of Congress," in the most unequivocal terms—and an opinion given at that time ought to put down, or at least neutralize, an adverse opinion delivered at an advanced period, when he was verging to the grave. I have quoted this recommendation, p. 14, but it cannot be improper to repeat it here.

"To cultivate peace; maintain commerce and navigation; to foster our fisheries; and PROTECT MANUFACTURES, adapted to our circumstances, &c. are the land-marks by which to guide ourselves in all our relations."*

If this recommendation be not conclusive as to Mr. Jefferson's views of this great subject, it is difficult to say what can be conclusive.

But the assumed unconstitutionality of the power of protection, has not probably produced so much excitement as the supposed danger of imposition on the part of the manufacturers, who, it was asserted and believed, would avail themselves of the opportunity of the partial exclusion of foreign competitors, to enhance the prices of their manufactures immoderately. On this ground, the most violent appeals were made to the passions of the people—and it is to be lamented, not unsuccessfully. It must be acknowledged that there was some plausibility in the argument, *a priori*, and it is not wonderful that it alarmed and aroused those who did not think deeply on the subject.

But the event has utterly belied all the predictions so confidently promulgated. Almost every article, perhaps I might safely say every one, that has been adequately protected, has fallen in price from ten to fifty per cent.—and they are not only lowered in price, but greatly improved in quality.†

* Mr. Jefferson's message in the Session of 1802.

† For full and complete proof of this position, see pp. 19, 20, 21.

It was rational to suppose that this result would have allayed the clamour, and tranquillized the public mind. But it is melancholy to find that this desirable object has not been attained. The same zeal, the same mischievous industry is in full operation to produce resistance, as existed previous to the reduction of prices—a resistance which cannot take place without producing civil war and all its frightful consequences. The perseverance in the clamour and in the unceasing efforts to perpetuate the dangerous excitement, with the impassioned invocations to resistance, notwithstanding the complete removal of one of the chief original grounds of complaint, lead to conclusions which I forbear to state. They may be easily conjectured.

The following are specimens of the spirit that prevails at present. They are taken from South Carolina papers published during the course of last month, when it was fondly hoped the effervescence had subsided.

“What right could the United States have to compel us by force of arms to continue members of the Union against our inclination, and for *the sole purpose of oppressing and robbing us*? If we earnestly and really profess to separate peaceably and quietly, there *can* be no war. The other states would never submit to it. How is it their interest to abridge their own rights? May not our case at a future time be their case also?

“Hence, *a quiet, peaceable, unoffending separation, if necessary, would be the easiest, the safest, the most prudent step.*”

“If the Legislature does not interpose at the next session, which I think ought to be called the first of November, and the Federal Government pursues the course we are almost bound to expect, I shall pronounce the opportunity gone! The states consolidated! the constitution lost, and state sovereignties reduced to provincial departments! The great question is, what is to be done? Simply this—let the Legislature do what it ought to have done last session. Demand a repeal of those laws—If not repealed, demand of Congress a call of the states in convention, and give to Congress a reasonable time to consider and return definite answers—*Let it be fully and explicitly understood, that if the proposals are not acceded, that from and immediately after the fourth of March next, such laws as have been declared unconstitutional, shall not be enforced within the territorial limits of the state by the Federal Government.* What then? War? No—*We shall have shifted the difficulty off our own shoulders on those of Congress. Congress violated our rights without much ceremony; let us, now, at last, defend them with as little.* One sovereignty cannot coerce another. Both natural and national law would make such an attempt a *declaration of war*. The moment therefore the Federal Government draws the sword to compel a sovereign state to submit to usurped powers, *will the Union be dissolved.* What then, would the states

assist the government to violate their own rights, to prostrate their own sovereignty? Is it not almost certain that the states would unite, and *set aside the powers of Congress, and form a simple confederacy, having two lights in their hands, they might perfect the Federative System, remodel it to comprehend all the Republics on the globe.*

“The next session of Congress will decide the question for ever—and if against us, the only alternative left us will be either to declare a **PEACEABLE SECESSION**, or else to declare the unconstitutional laws a *nullity and not to be obeyed*.—The South have unequivocally said that ultimate submission is utterly out of the question. The people have declared more unanimously than any whole people was ever known to do on any other political question, that they will not submit. The mind of the whole country is calmly but unequivocally made up that they **WILL GET RID OF THE YOKE AT ANY AND AT ALL HAZARDS.**”

It is impossible for citizens who love their country—who prize its union—and cherish its fame at home and abroad, to read the threats of separation and calls to arms so frequently repeated, now to the south, and formerly, during the administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, to the east, without feelings of deep regret and astonishment. The ground on which those threats rested, and rest, for justification, are, and have been, perfectly illusory—and, in a sound state of the public mind, would be hooted down as the bravadoes of intemperance, or the ravings of insanity. But the press, that most inestimable of instruments, for the promotion of human happiness and civilization, when well conducted, but an instrument of most serious evils when under improper management, has been so long industriously employed in inflaming the public mind, that there is scarcely any hope of gaining a calm and candid hearing for the dictates of reason and common sense.

What was the ground to palliate and justify the seditious, the treasonable proceedings in New England, to which I have referred? The absurd idea, before the war, that the great and good Jefferson was a pensioner and vassal of Bonaparte,—that he had sold his country to that monarch,—and was obliged to obey his orders. During the war the clamour was, that it was wanton and unprovoked on our part—and it is a lamentable instance of human infatuation, that in an enlightened age and country, such romances were implicitly believed by millions of our citizens—by entire sections of the country.

The violent and outrageous excitement that prevailed at that

time in New England, was fomented by no small portion of the bench, the bar, the pulpit, and the press—an unholy union which prepared the public mind for “*resistance unto blood*,” as expressly stated in the Newburyport resolutions.

The citizens who were thus misled to the verge of sacrificing the noblest form of government the world was ever blessed with, now look back with horror at the precipice to which they were led, step by step, and from which they and the nation escaped almost by miracle.

The extravagant assumptions of those days would not now pass current with any person beyond the state of idiocy—for there is not one man in a thousand who is not satisfied, that Jefferson was as pure a statesman as ever graced the American annals—that there never was a more just war than ours—and that no nation, able to defend itself, ever displayed a greater or more protracted degree of forbearance before its declaration.

Ten years, perhaps five years hence, the present fermentation to the south, and the threats of separation, will be regarded as equally absurd with those to the eastward in days past and gone.

What are the grounds of the present clamour to the south? First, that the proceedings of our government, for about forty years, on the subject of the protection of manufactures, have been unconstitutional, though pronounced constitutional by the men who penned the constitution, and who must have known its metes and bounds—and that Mr. James Hamilton, Mr. George M'Duffie, Governor Miller, and Judge Cooper, are more correct expounders of the instrument than General Washington and the host of illustrious citizens whose opinions in favour of the constitutionality of the protecting system have been repeatedly published.

To heighten the absurdity, Judge Cooper, who has been the grand fomenter of the excitement, was himself one of the most efficient and eloquent supporters of the system of protection in 1813.

The other ground of opposition is, that the tariff, by producing an enhancement of the prices of manufactures, is a direct robbery perpetrated by the eastern states on the south, although *it is a matter of public notoriety that it has produced a directly contrary effect.*

If any state in the Union has, or ever had, a right to threaten

a separation—and if any state could derive advantage from that measure, it would be pre-eminently Pennsylvania. Her grand staples, bread stuffs, are excluded from every market in Europe except on the approach of famine. Yet no threat of separation has ever been lisped. Were the first man in the state to broach such an idea, he would make shipwreck of his popularity and influence—although the prohibition of our staples reduced the price of real estate at least 33 per cent. Real estate, in Pennsylvania, by an assessment made by order of Congress, in 1815, appeared to be above \$315,000,000. An assessment in 1819 or 1820, reduced it above \$100,000,000.

Suppose a separate independent government established in Pennsylvania, would she receive the iron and woollen and cotton manufactures of Great Britain, or the silks of France, without reciprocity? Certainly not. Prohibition would be met by prohibition—we should attract their artists and manufacturers to our shore,—gain immense accessions of population—find full employment for the whole—make permanent markets for our agricultural productions—turn our coal and our iron to good account—and be one of the most prosperous nations under the canopy of heaven.

During the violent clashing of opinions and calls to arms, it has not been considered that when the first Congress protected manufactures by duties on imports, agriculture and commerce participated largely in the advantages of the system. The duties on cotton and hemp, were imposed expressly to encourage the cultivation of those articles to the South, which, at that time, was in a most lamentable state of depression.

“The staple products of South Carolina,” observed Æ. Burke, in 1789, “were *hardly worth cultivation, on account of their fall in price*. The lands were certainly *well adapted to the culture of hemp*, and he had no doubt but its culture would be practised with attention. *Cotton was likewise in contemplation among them; and if good seed could be procured, he hoped it would succeed*. But the low strong rice lands would produce hemp in abundance, many thousand tons even this year, if it was not so late in the season.”—Lloyd’s Debates, Vol. I. p. 79.

“The situation of South Carolina,” observed Mr. Tucker, in the same debate, “was melancholy. While the inhabitants were deeply in debt, *the produce of the state was daily falling in*

price. *Rice and indigo were become so low, as to be considered by many not objects worthy of cultivation.*”—Idem, p. 98.

A heavy duty was laid on indigo for the purpose of protection. Various other agricultural articles were heavily dutied on the same principle.

The duty on cotton was 3 cents per pound; which was $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the cost of the article in the West Indies, while the duty on muslins was only 5 per cent.

The average price of Bengal and Surat cotton at present, in the Liverpool market, is four pence, equal to about 7 cents. Thus the duty on a bulky article, subject to heavy freight and various charges, is actually 40 per cent. if imported from Liverpool. And if we suppose, as surely we may, that the expenses on it, in its transportation for 10,000 miles, enhanced the price on its arrival in Liverpool a penny farthing, our duty is about 60 per cent. on the cost of the article in the East Indies. This is a more substantial protection than any manufactures have, except cottons and woollens.

A prohibitory duty, amounting to from 70 a 100 per cent. was laid on snuff and manufactured tobacco, expressly to secure to our tobacco planters, the supply of the country. This object has been fully attained—the whole amount of both articles imported last year having been only 524 dollars. The duty on snuff at present is 50 per cent.

Brown sugar is 6 cents per pound in the West Indies. The duty is 3 cents, equal to 50 per cent. on an article subject to heavy freight, largely consumed by the poor, and which, from use, has become a necessary of life. The quantity made in Louisiana last year was 87,965 hhds. at about 1,000 pounds to the hhd., equal to 87,965,000 pounds, being 50 per cent beyond the amount of the brown sugar imported, which was only 51,686,955 pounds.

Notwithstanding the protection of 60 per cent. on cotton and 50 per cent. on sugar; 50 per cent. on manufactured tobacco and 60 per cent. on snuff, for the protection of the tobacco planter; the cotton and sugar and tobacco planters have almost universally opposed the protection of manufactures!

“*Protection*” was extended to commerce by the first Congress in almost every practicable mode. I shall confine myself, however, to two most remarkable instances, which must be conclu-

sive on this subject. The tonnage duty on American vessels was only 6 cents—but on foreign vessels was 50 cents—and as if this was not enough, the former, engaged in the coasting trade, paid only once a year, whereas the latter paid on every entry. Thus an American vessel of 400 tons, engaged in the foreign trade, paid on each entry, only 24 dollars tonnage duty, while a foreign vessel, of the same description, paid 200! And an American vessel of 100 tons, engaged in the coasting trade, and making twelve entries per annum, paid but *six dollars*—whereas a foreign vessel, of the same size, and making the same number of entries, would pay *six hundred*! The duty on teas imported in American vessels averaged 12 cents per pound—in foreign vessels, 27 cents. Thus, at one stroke, foreigners were cut off from the coasting and China trade, and their vessels greatly circumscribed in the foreign trade generally. These are fair specimens of the fostering “*protection*” afforded by duties to commerce; and yet there has never, I believe, been a single application by the manufacturers for protection since the organization of the government, which the merchants generally have not opposed!

And can there be found a citizen of character who values his reputation, that will assert, that it is constitutional to “*protect*” agriculture and commerce by duties, but a violation of the constitution to protect manufactures by the same means? I trust not.

That the tariff of 1828 has not answered the expectations of those who petitioned for it, cannot be doubted. Many of them have been since severely injured, and some of them wholly ruined. A part of the ruin may perhaps be ascribed to the efforts of those members of Congress who were opposed to the tariff, and loaded it with obnoxious clauses in the hope of defeating it. But the chief part of the evil has arisen from the cupidity of gain, which is one of the greatest of the besetting sins of the country, whereby production was immoderately forced—a sin which blasts and withers industry, in all its various branches. Wherever any pursuit proves profitable, too many rush into it, and involve themselves and others in difficulty or ruin. Production outruns consumption. Glutted markets—reduced prices—and not merely a cessation of profits, but actual losses, are the necessary consequence. This state of things is

not confined to manufactures. It embraces in its vortex agriculture and commerce. All are overdone.

But to confine ourselves to the case of the manufacturers—whatever they have suffered—however they may have cause to lament the issue—and whatever sympathy their case is calculated to excite in the breasts of those who are not hardened by the violent and outrageous appeals which have been so often made to the angry passions, the purchasers of their merchandise, so far as their personal interests are concerned, have no cause to complain. Whoever may lose, or whatever may be the amount of the loss, he profits by it who purchases their goods at 5, 10, or 15 per cent. below cost, as is unfortunately too often the case at present.

To these addresses I have annexed five appendixes, which are of more importance than my own lucubrations. They are all deeply interesting. It is hoped that the powerful arguments of Judge Cooper will lose nothing of their weight or influence by the wonderful change that has been wrought in the Judge's sentiments of late. The same observation will apply to the luminous speech of Vice president Calhoun, whose sentiments also appear to have been considerably modified. The case of Russia and of Holland so feelingly described, the former by the Emperor himself, the latter by a citizen of Belgium, cannot fail to hold out an admonitory lesson to our government. And finally the Report of the Committee of Agriculture of the House of Representatives of the United States, composed, I believe, entirely of agriculturists, some of them among the most intelligent and respectable citizens in the country, is well worth a perusal ten times over.

With a fervent wish that these pages may tend to remove inveterate and pernicious prejudices—to allay the irritation that prevails to the south—to revive those good feelings which ought to, and which until recently did, prevail, among fellow citizens embarked in the same vessel of state, but which some misguided individuals have been endeavouring to destroy—and to discourage and discountenance the horrible idea of "*resistance*," and of "*acting the scenes of the revolution over again*," as the southern people are publicly exhorted to do, I commit them to the good sense of the nation at large, but more especially to the citizens of the southern states. And it ought not to detract

from their influence, that I neither have, nor ever had, any personal interest in the question, and that nothing could have induced me to resume my pen again on the subject, under almost every conceivable discouragement,* but a deep, a thorough, an unalterable conviction, of the immense importance of the protecting system to enable this highly-favoured nation to attain the magnificent elevation designed for it by God and nature.

M. CAREY.

Philadelphia, Nov. 2, 1829.

"Truths would you teach—or save a sinking land—

"All fear—none aid you—and few understand."

COMMON SENSE ADDRESSES.

NO. 1.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS,

The Tariff Bill of 1828, has excited considerable heart burnings in your section of the Union, which are fostered and aggravated by citizens labouring under ill founded prejudices, many of whom have gone the extravagant length of menacing resistance to it—in other words, insurrection and dissolution of the Union.* Men acting under such violent impulses, are dan-

* "In advising an ATTITUDE OF OPEN RESISTANCE TO THE LAWS OF THE UNION, we deem it due to the occasion, and that we may not be misunderstood, distinctly, but truly to state, without argument, our constitutional faith.

"We feel ourselves standing under the mighty protection of the Constitution, and declaring forth its free and recorded spirit, when we say, **WE MUST RESIST**. By all the great principles of liberty—by the glorious achievements of our fathers in defending them—by their noble blood, poured out like water in maintaining them—by their lives in suffering, and their deaths in honour and in glory, our countrymen, **WE MUST RESIST**.

"Does timidity ask, when? We answer *NOW—even now*, when oppression is not old to us, and the free spirit looks abroad, in pride over and on this land of glorious freedom, and of beautiful, though depressed and broken fertility." Address of Colleton district.

"If the southern states resist the daring encroachments upon their rights—if they successfully oppose the exercise of all unconstitutional laws—**IF**, in short, **THEY RISE IN THE MAJESTY OF THEIR STRENGTH**, with the assistance of Divine Providence, they may snatch from the grasp of ambition and pollution the federal constitution—may preserve the Union from the vile attempts to destroy it—and *may save the country from an intestine war!*"

Milledgeville Journal.

"**THE MEMORABLE SCENES OF OUR REVOLUTION HAVE AGAIN TO BE ACTED OVER.**" Idem.

"**WE HAVE SWORN, THAT CONGRESS SHALL, AT OUR DEMAND, REPEAL THE TARIFF.** If she does not, **OUR STATE LEGISLATURE WILL DISSOLVE OUR CONNEXION WITH THE UNION**, and *we will take our stand among the nations: and it behoves every true Carolinian "TO STAND BY HIS ARMS," and to keep the halls of our legislature pure from foreign intruders*"

Charleston Courier.

"Let Congress be distinctly told, that *either the general government must recede from its pretensions to inordinate powers, or the STATE MUST RECEDE FROM THE COMPACT*: and should that government resolutely persist in the scheme of subverting our prosperity and sovereignty, to their very foundations, let the governor be directed, by proclamation to open our ports to the vessels of all nations, not excepting even those of our northern friends or enemies. Let no customs be exacted, except by our own officers; and let all judges, magistrates, constables, and other citizens, be called upon to support the state authority and laws, and be **INDEMNIFIED FOR DISOBEDIENCE TO FEDERAL AUTHORITIES**. All this may be done without the spilling of one drop of blood. There will be no necessity for firing a gun. Let the U S government fire the first shot if it chooses. Better it would be that it had been born with a millstone around its neck, than to try this. *We must take care not to be the aggressors IN THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD*" Milledgeville Journal.

"Resolved, That in the opinion of this meeting the several acts of the Con-

gerous guides, and those who surrender their reason and understanding to them, are in a fair way to be led to dangerous excesses, and to commit acts, for which the severest penance of the longest life can never atone.

Judge Cooper, to whose writings the chief part of the effervescence that prevails to the south, may be fairly traced, held the following inflammatory language to a town-meeting at Columbia, so early as the second of July, 1827—

*"We shall ere long be COMPELLED TO CALCULATE THE VALUE OF OUR UNION, and to inquire of what use to us is this most unequal alliance, by which the south has always been the loser, and the north always the gainer? IS IT WORTH OUR WHILE TO CONTINUE THIS UNION OF STATES when the north demand to be our masters, and we are required to be their tributaries? Who, with an insulting mockery, call the yoke they put upon our necks, the American system! The question, however, is fast approaching to the ALTERNATIVE OF SUBMISSION OR SEPARATION."**

This is plain language, about which there can be no mistake.

gress of the United States, for the encouragement of the manufactures of the United States, are destructive to the labour and capital of the Southern states, and OUGHT NOT TO BE SUBMITTED TO.

"Resolved, That THE ADHESION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO THE UNION should depend upon THE UNCONDITIONAL REPEAL of the Tariff laws of 1816, 1824, and 1828, so far as they are inconsistent with the constitutional rights of our citizens." Resolutions of St. John's Parish, S. C.

"This is not the language of vainglorious boasting, of hotheaded enthusiasm—it is the resolute voice of despair. It is useless to disguise matters—or to shut our eyes upon the possible (must we say probable?) consequences. If this spirit spreads over the south—and what can prevent it?—CIVIL WAR MUST FOLLOW, AND THE BONDS OF THIS UNION ARE BROKEN."

What a striking contrast between this seditious language and the (I had almost said sacred,) admonitions of General Washington:—

"The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at home; of your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously,) directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a co-dial, habitual, and immoveable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as the Palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts."—General Washington's Farewell Address.

Fellow citizens—you have here two sets of admonitions, as opposite as Erebus to the Elysian fields. Under which banner will you array yourselves?

* It is a curious fact, worthy of the serious consideration of this nation, that the most powerful and conclusive essay in favour of the promotion and advantages and protection of manufactures ever written in this country, was the production of Judge Cooper, in 1813. The arguments are irresistible. See Appendix, A.

It meant, if the protecting system were extended, that the sacred fabric of union, which was erected with so much difficulty by some of the best men the world was ever blest with, was to be demolished by an infuriate people, roused to madness by inflammatory appeals to all the angry passions! And the firebrand has not been lighted in vain. The flame has spread rapidly.

I hope you will favour me with a calm hearing, while I endeavour to assuage your irritation, and attempt, by a candid appeal from blind passion and excited feeling, to incontrovertible facts and plain reasoning, to prove that four of the most plausible objections to the measure of protection are wholly unfounded.

The objections to which I refer, are—

1. That the powers of Europe, particularly Great Britain, convinced of the pernicious effects of the protecting system, are abandoning it as fast as they can, consistently with a due regard for existing interests.

2. That the imposition of high duties will provoke retaliation on the part of the powers of Europe, particularly Great Britain, and that heavy duties will be imposed on your great staples, cotton and tobacco.

3. That the protection of manufactures by the imposition of duties, is absolutely unconstitutional.

4. That the imposition of high duties is unjust and oppressive to the consumers of the articles thus dutied, as they proportionably enhance the prices.

I shall, moreover, endeavour to prove,

5. That the distress and ruin, experienced in the south, have arisen from the system of policy so ardently supported by the southern states themselves, in 1816, and which by their support prevailed till the year 1824; and that the complete protection and prosperity of manufactures would go far to rescue them from their present state of depression.

Let it be distinctly observed that I do not pretend to offer new facts or arguments on this subject. It has been so long and so elaborately discussed, that it is completely exhausted. If it be asked, why, then, touch the subject at all? I reply, that the facts and arguments I am about to adduce, have not been sufficiently circulated to the south; that, where they have been circulated, they have not generally had that sober consideration to which the importance of the subject entitles them; and finally, because there are no new arguments adduced on the other side of the question—and the repetition of refuted arguments requires a repetition of the refutation.

1. *The Liberal System of Europe.* 2. *Retaliation.*

I shall discuss these two objections under one head; as the facts and arguments which apply conclusively to obviate the one, equally prove the want of foundation of the other.

It is asserted, and has been asserted for eight or ten years, that the nations of Europe, particularly Great Britain, opening their eyes to the folly and ignorance of their ancestors, are abandoning restrictions, and introducing a free and liberal system of commerce.

I shall separate the case of the continent of Europe from that of Great Britain—and as I am not bound to prove a negative, I call on Dr. Cooper, and those who support his doctrines, to produce any instances of important relaxations of the restrictive system by any of the continental powers, since the fatal alterations made in Holland,* in 1816, and in Russia, in 1820, both of which nations suffered the most intense distress from the change. No such cases can be adduced—but unless they are adduced, and proved, the assertion must be regarded as utterly destitute of foundation. Russia, after two years of calamity and suffering from the effects of what is pompously styled “*the liberal system*,” was obliged in 1822 to renounce it, and to have recourse to the protecting system once more.†

The case of Great Britain is, however, far more important to us, as our commerce with her is equal to that with all the rest of Europe, and more particularly as we are more *au fait* to judge of her policy, from having superior means of information respecting it. I shall examine it under the two-fold point of view, as regards her theory and her practice. Mr. Huskisson’s explicit declarations on the subject of the protecting system, are the *theory* of that nation. For the *practice*, I shall rely on the existence of the corn laws, in spite of the efforts of so large a portion of the nation, which operate as an effectual exclusion of our bread stuffs, the chief dependence of five or six millions of our population, except in cases of extreme dearth; the enormous duties on our lumber; and the heavy duties on some other articles. If these items do not show the utter fallacy of the idea that Great Britain has abandoned the restrictive system, then the conflagration of Moscow does not prove the existence there of devouring flames.

And first of the *theory*, for which there can be no better authority than Mr. Huskisson’s declarations, which are explicit in favour of the protecting system. He introduced his much-lauded but ill-understood bill with this explanation—

“In requesting the attention of the committee, while I state the alterations which I propose to recommend in the duties levied upon the importation of materials employed in some of our principal manufactures, and also in the prohibitory duties now imposed upon the manufactured productions of other countries, I need scarcely bespeak the disposition of the committee to *countenance the principle of these proposals*, SO FAR AS THEY SHALL BE FOUND NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF OUR OWN INDUSTRY.”‡

* See Appendix, B.

† See Appendix, C.

‡ Huskisson’s Speech on Foreign Commerce, London, 1825, p. 35.

He assumed the ground—and a plausible ground it was—that Great Britain being able to undersell the manufacturers of other nations in their own markets, had no cause to dread their competition at home. On this alone he relied for a justification of the reduction of the duties on the various articles, which the protecting system has enabled Great Britain to bring to perfection :—

“With the knowledge of this fact, that we furnish—in a proportion far exceeding the supply from any other country—the general markets of the world with ALL THE LEADING ARTICLES OF MANUFACTURE, upon which I have now proposed greatly to lower the duties, I own that *I am not afraid of this country being overwhelmed with foreign manufactures*. Some, I know, will come in, which are now excluded. I shall be glad of it.”*

“*With regard to the danger of our being undersold in our own markets, it does not hold at all.*”†

I presume this is abundantly sufficient to establish the important fact, that “*protection*” is as much the basis of Mr. Huskisson’s theory, as it was that of any of his predecessors.

I now proceed to state the facts of the case as regards the existing tariff, to show that there is a perfect accordance between them and the theory—and that such of our citizens as have believed in the adoption of a liberal system of free trade in Great Britain, have been grievously mistaken.

Notwithstanding that our bread-stuffs, have been absolutely prohibited in Great Britain, for above ten years, yet, during the whole of that period, we have been constantly assured, that her

“Statesmen, in admiration of the success of our policy, were relaxing the rigour of their system, and yielding themselves to the rational doctrine, that national wealth is best promoted by a free interchange of commodities, upon principles of perfect reciprocity !”

This idea has been retailed in a hundred different shapes and forms—but that it should have been broached in the face of the strong fact of the existence of the corn-laws—and should have found thousands and tens of thousands of credulous believers, is an addition to the great variety of examples which tend to prove how easily confident assertions are too frequently admitted as demonstrations. It is difficult to conceive of an assertion more destitute of foundation.

For years there has been a constant clamour in England for a repeal of the corn-laws, as a panacea for the multiplied evils of the lower classes of society, who, it is said, are most grievously taxed for the peculiar benefit of the landed interest. This is not the place to discuss the question of the repeal, or perhaps it might be demonstrated that while it would ruin the great farming interest, it would produce but a very moderate offset of advantage to the rest of the nation, whom, moreover, the depression of the farming interest must involve in distress. Be this as it

* Huskisson’s Speech on Foreign Commerce, London, 1825, p. 53.

† Idem, p. 56.

may, Mr. Canning made an attempt to modify those laws, and abate some of their rigour. He brought a bill into the house of commons, which, after most ardent debates, was passed in that house, but rejected in the house of lords, as incompatible with a due regard to the interests of the landholders. Many of our citizens, during the discussion, flattered themselves into the opinion that the repeal, so confidently anticipated, would open a market for our flour, and thus relieve our farmers from the depression under which they have laboured for years, and large and ruinous exportations took place in consequence.

In the course of the year 1828, the system of the corn-laws was modified; all former laws on the subject repealed; and the following duties imposed on the importation of the different kinds of grain. There is every reason to believe, that this will continue the permanent system of Great Britain on this subject, and that thus her markets will be constantly closed against our farmers, except on extraordinary occasions.

WHEAT, Per Imperial Quarter.		BARLEY, Per Imperial Qr.		RYE, BEANS, AND PEASE, Per Imperial Qr.		OATS, Per Imperial Qr.	
Average Prices, at or above.	Duties.	Average Prices, at or above.	Duties.	Average prices, at or above.	Duties.	Average prices, at or above.	Duties.
s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
45 0	41 8	16 0	37 10	19 0	40 9	8 0	34 9
46 0	40 8	17 0	36 4	20 0	39 3	9 0	33 3
47 0	39 8	18 0	34 10	21 0	37 9	10 0	31 9
48 0	38 8	19 0	33 4	22 0	36 3	11 0	30 3
49 0	37 8	20 0	31 10	23 0	34 9	12 0	28 9
50 0	36 8	21 0	30 4	24 0	33 3	13 0	27 3
51 0	35 8	22 0	28 10	25 0	31 9	14 0	25 9
52 0	34 8	23 0	27 4	26 0	30 3	15 0	24 3
53 0	33 8	24 0	25 10	27 0	28 9	16 0	22 9
54 0	32 8	25 0	24 4	28 0	27 3	17 0	21 3
55 0	31 8	26 0	22 10	29 0	25 9	18 0	19 9
56 0	30 8	27 0	21 4	30 0	24 3	19 0	18 3
57 0	29 8	28 0	19 10	31 0	22 9	20 0	16 9
58 0	28 8	29 0	18 4	32 0	21 3	21 0	15 3
59 0	27 8	30 0	16 10	33 0	19 9	22 0	13 9
60 0	26 8	31 0	15 4	34 0	18 3	23 0	12 3
61 0	25 8	32 0	13 10	35 0	16 9	24 0	10 9
62 0	24 8	33 0	12 4	36 0	15 6	25 0	9 3
63 0	23 8	34 0	10 10	37 0	14 0	26 0	7 9
64 0	22 8	35 0	9 4	38 0	12 6	27 0	6 3
65 0	21 8	36 0	7 10	39 0	11 0	28 0	4 9
66 0	20 8	37 0	6 4	40 0	9 6	29 0	3 3
67 0	18 8	38 0	4 10	41 0	8 0	30 0	1 9
68 0	16 8	39 0	3 4	42 0	6 6	31 0	1 0
69 0	13 8	40 0	1 10	43 0	5 0	—	—
70 0	10 8	41 0	1 0	44 0	3 6	—	—
71 0	6 8	—	—	45 0	2 0	—	—
72 0	2 8	—	—	46 0	1 0	—	—
73 0	1 0	—	—	—	—	—	—

This is truly a new way of "*cutting the cords that tie commerce to the earth*," according to the favourite and fashionable phrase of the political economists of the new school. When the imperial quarter of wheat sells for 45s., our wheat and our flour are subject to a duty of above ninety per cent.—when barley sells for 16s. per quarter, it is subject to a duty of 37s. or above 220 per cent.—Rye, beans, or pease, when at 19s. pay 40s. or above 100 per cent.—and on oats, when at 8s. the duty is 34s. or 425 per cent. And these exorbitant duties on our leading staples, were not laid in the days of our ignorant and besotted ancestors, as the statesmen of old times are called. No. They were imposed last year, by the collected wisdom of England in parliament assembled. Nevertheless, in the face of this overwhelming fact, we are stunned with the most confident assertions, that we are adopting the policy that Great Britain is discarding! And while this virtual prohibition of our bread stuffs continues, we are threatened in the British parliament and by our own writers with retaliation for our unprovoked and undisguised hostility, because we have dared to increase our duties on foreign manufactures, to protect our own from ruin! Truly, this is a most wonderful state of things.

But we are more interested in the duty on flour, as we export but little wheat, or other grain, to Great Britain. When the average price of flour in the British markets is six dollars, the duty is about five dollars and forty cents! When the price rises to about nine dollars, the duty is, it is true, only about one hundred and fifty cents. But in the case of such a rise, the markets would be glutted from the Baltic and Odessa long before our vessels could arrive. By the circular of W. and J. Brown, of Sept. 8th, 1829, it appears that the price of flour was 36s. *a* 37s. or about eight dollars. The duty was 12s. 5d. equal to about \$2.76. Our market price is \$5.25. The duty added to this raises the article beyond the market price in England, exclusive of freight, commissions, and the various other items of expense, amounting on the whole to probably a dollar and a quarter per barrel. This is a virtual exclusion. Let it be observed, moreover, that in the event of a favourable market in Great Britain, the price here would at once rise from one to two dollars per barrel. Bonded flour was of "very dull sale" at 26s. to 26s. 6d., equal to about \$5 75. On this flour, there must be a loss of at least a dollar per barrel.

The steady policy of Great Britain, *in this liberal age*, is, that let the price of foreign flour be what it may, none of it shall be consumed in that country below ten dollars per barrel.

Three Tables of British duties in my next number.

Philadelphia, October 24, 1829.

NO. 2.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS,

In my former number I overlooked a most important item, which would be sufficient to establish the magnitude of the errors that prevail on the subject of the liberal system of Great Britain.

In a debate in parliament on the admission of Canadian corn into Great Britain, Mr. Neuman said—

"He was favourable to the importation of corn from the Canadas; but great precaution ought to be taken to prevent the receiving the corn of the United States instead of that of our own colonies."*

Mr. Huskisson in reply said—

"In order to allay the fears of those who dreaded the importation of American corn, he had no objection to say, that if, during five years the average importation of what was called Canadian corn should exceed 100,000 quarters, *he should take that fact as evidence that there had been a fraudulent importation of American corn, and that it was necessary to adopt some measures to guard against it.*†

The following extracts from Mr. Huskisson's speech are taken from another report of the same debate—

"He should be quite willing to adopt any method necessary to prevent *the fraudulent mixing of the United States' corn with the corn of Canada!*"

"With a view of removing all cause of alarm, and giving *an adequate security against the fraudulent introduction of Canada [American] wheat*, he should propose a clause, by way of rider, that *there should be the same certificate of origin as in the case of sugar.*" * * "The protecting duty which he should propose AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN CORN INTO THIS COUNTRY, *would be precisely the same as that which already existed in the Canadas.*"

I appeal to your good sense and candour, fellow citizens, whether this single fact, if it stood alone, does not put down, for ever, the unqualified assertions so often and so confidently repeated, and wherewith the American public has been amused, of the abandonment of the restrictive system in Great Britain. If American grain is clandestinely introduced through the medium of Canada, "*it will be necessary to take measures to prevent it!*"

And yet Judge Cooper informs us, that—

"While we have been agitating the question here, the ministry and the parliament of Great Britain, lamenting the intricacy of the restrictive system, *declare their wish to get rid of it as soon as they can!*"

"Our legislators have the repentant example of Europe before them."

And the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce inform us in the same strain—

"*England has grown rich in spite of her restrictions upon trade, and not by means of them. Her wisest statesmen are desirous of removing them, and can trace with unerring certainty to their operation, a large part of the oppression under which the fundamental interest of that nation languishes, and is doomed to languish.*"

* Parliamentary History and Review, London, 1826, page 339.

† Ibid.

I now proceed to exhibit the three tables promised in my last.

The first contains a list of thirty articles, with the duties in Great Britain and in the United States: the former of which are, in many cases, three times as great as the latter.

The second contains a list of nine articles, with their prices in Philadelphia and their duties in Great Britain, varying from 80 to 2000 per cent.

The third contains a list of the duties on lumber, of various kinds, from Canada and the U. States, by which it appears that for the encouragement of her colonies, G. Britain imposes on lumber from the U. States duties, in some cases 1500 per cent. higher than on that from Canada.

TABLE I.

List of articles subject in Great Britain to specific duties, with the American duties on the same. The British duties reduced to Federal currency.

		BRITISH DUTIES.*		American Duties.
		Sterling.	Currency.	
Burrs for millstones pay	per 100	76s. = to	\$ 16.88	free
Buckwheat - - -	quarter	12s.	2.66	15 per cent.
Blacking - - -	cwt.	72s.	16.00	15 per cent.
Bricks - - -	1000	22s. 6d.	5.00	15 per cent.
Bristles, dressed -	doz. lb.	12s.	2.66	36 cents.
Crown glass, not plate	cwt.	166s. 8d.	36.80	\$4 per 100ft.
Cards, playing -	dozen	80s.	17.77	\$3 60
Cider - - -	tun	420s. 10d.	93.52	15 per cent.
Feathers, for beds -	cwt.	44s.	9.77	15 per cent.
German steel - - -	cwt.	200s.	44.44	\$ 1 per cwt.
Hair powder - - -	cwt.	195s.	43.33	15 per cent.
Do. perfumed	cwt.	273s.	60.66	15 per cent.
Lampblack - - -	cwt.	66s.	14.66	15 per cent.
Mill and pasteboards	cwt.	68s. 2d.	15.15	\$ 16 80
Pictures, under 2 feet	each	68s.	15.11	15 per cent.
Do. under 4 feet	each	136s.	30.20	15 per cent.
Do. above 4 feet	each	204s.	45.33	15 per cent.
Platting of straw -	lb.	17s.	3.77	50 per cent.
Do. horsehair	lb.	20s.	4.44	30 per cent.
Parchment - - -	doz. sheets	10s.	2.22	30 per cent.
Straw hats, not exceed- ing 22 inches - -	dozen	68s.	15.11	} 50 per cent. if cost above a dollar.
Straw hats, exceeding 22 inches - - -	dozen	136s.	30.22	
Starch - - -	cwt.	190s.	42.22	15 per cent.
Sugar, refined - - -	cwt.	168s.	37.33	\$ 13 44
Sugarcandy, brown	cwt.	112s.	24.88	\$ 13 44
Do. white. - - -	cwt.	168s.	37.33	\$ 13 44
Spermaceti candles -	lb.	2s. 6d.	.55	8 cents.
Tallow candles - -	cwt.	63s. 4d.	14.08	\$5 60
White wax - - -	cwt.	123s. 6d.	27.44	15 per cent.

TABLE II.

Prices of sundry articles in Philadelphia, with the British duties thereon, in Federal currency.

	Philadelphia Prices.	British Duties.*	Equal to per cent.
Cards, per dozen - - - -	\$ 4.00	\$17.77	430
Starch, per cwt. - - - -	5.00	42.	840
Bricks, per 1000 - - - -	6.50	5.	73
Pasteboard, per cwt. - - -	5.00	15.15	300
Refined sugar, per lb. - - -	.18	.33	183
Tallow candles, per lb. - -	.12	.13	110
Wax candles, per lb. - - -	.62½	.55	80
Cider, per bbl. - - - -	3.00	11.62	375
Tobacco, per lb. - - - -	.3½ a7	.67	800, a 1900

TABLE III.

BRITISH DUTIES.*	From British possessions.	From the U. States and other parts.
On Timber, per load, fir and oak - - - - <i>sterling</i>	10s. 0d.	55s. 0d.
Handspikes, under 7 feet - - - -	2s. 6d.	40s. 0d.
Do. 7 feet and upwards - - - -	5s. 0d.	80s. 0d.
Lathwood, 12 feet long and upwards, per fathom -	25s. 0d.	272s. 0d.
Clap-boards, not exceeding 5 feet long, per 120 -	12s. 4d.	122s. 0d.
Knees of oak, per 120, under 5 inches square -	2s. 0d.	10s. 0d.
5 inches and under 8 - - - -	15s. 0d.	80s. 0d.
Oars, per 120 - - - -	19s. 6d.	299s. 3d.
Deals, above 7 inches in width and not above 16 feet long, per 120 - - - -	40s. 0d.	380s. 0d.
Ditto, above 16 feet and not above 21 - - - -	50s. 0d.	440s. 0d.
Masts, yards, and bowsprits, 6 inches, and under 8 in diameter, each - - - -	1s. 6d.	8s. 0d.
Ditto, 8 inches and under 12 - - - -	4s. 0d.	22s. 0d.
Oak plank, 2 inches thick or upwards, per load of 50 cubic feet - - - -	15s. 0d.	80s. 0d.
Spokes for wheels, exceeding 4 feet long, per 1000	9s. 4d.	134s. 8d.

The above duties vary from 500 to 1500 per cent. more on timber from the United States than on the same articles from the British colonies. It is needless to state that this is, to all intents and purposes, a prohibition, and yet we are amused, I had almost said, insulted, by vociferations of "*cutting the cords that tie commerce to the earth*," and by assertions that "*the statesmen of the old world are relaxing the rigour of their systems, and yielding themselves to the rational doctrine that national wealth is best promoted by a free interchange of commodities upon principles of PERFECT RECIPROCITY.*" Where is the reciprocity between duties of 5, 8, 10, 12, and 1500 per cent. on our timber, and 20 or 25 per cent. on manufactures of iron, steel, brass and copper?

With these strong facts staring Judge Cooper in the face, he gravely threatens the United States with the resentment of Great Britain, if they dare make any addition to the duties on manufactures imported, which, he very illogically construes into an

* The British duties in the above tables, let it be observed, are from the tariff of 1825. Whether any alterations have taken place since, I know not.

absolute prohibition to "*purchase the manufactures of Great Britain!*"

"If we must not purchase the manufactures of Great Britain, the latter will not purchase our cotton, rice, or tobacco."

"I appeal to men conversant with the subject, that she can supply herself *in half a dozen or ten years* elsewhere; with rice from the East Indies, cotton from Brazil, and tobacco from the *Crimea*. She does not, because she purchases the raw material with the produce of her own warehouses: and the trade is mutually gainful."†

The Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce held the same language.—

"We must prepare to see the East Indies, the Brazils, the Black Sea, *every quarter of the habitable globe*, stimulated by bounty to itself, and by restrictions upon us, to take our place in the markets of Europe, and to leave these commodities upon our hands."

I presume, I need not go further with regard to the first objection, that is "that we are taking up the system of restriction when it is abandoned in Europe"—and as to the second, that is, "the danger of retaliatory duties on our cotton and tobacco," it will be sufficient to ask, can Great Britain, excluding as she does, by virtual prohibition, our bread-stuffs—and our lumber, by duties from 500 to 1500 per cent. higher than those on the lumber of her own provinces, have the least pretext for retaliating on us for any duties we have laid, or may lay hereafter, or even were we absolutely to prohibit some of her most important manufactures altogether? Is it not the height of absurdity for British members of parliament, and editors of British newspapers, as well as our own writers and chambers of commerce, to menace us with the resentment of Great Britain, as if we were the aggressors in the business of restriction, when for ten years, from 1818 till 1828, we bore, with the most exemplary patience and resignation, the absolute unqualified prohibition of our bread stuffs, the main dependance of probably one-half of our population? Great Britain consults, and is right in consulting, her own interests, and the welfare of her people, in the imposition of duties. We have a right to follow the same course.

It is scarcely credible, but is nevertheless true, that our exports of rice and tobacco to Great Britain and Ireland, with the exclusion of which Judge Cooper threatens us "*in half a dozen or ten years*," by supplies "*from the East Indies and the Crimea*," were in the year 1828 but little more than \$2,000,000.

Rice, 59,577 tierces	- -	\$ 430,246
Tobacco, 26,719 hhds.	- . -	1,720,571

\$2,150,817

And above one-half of the tobacco was exported to and consumed on the continent. The consumption in Great Britain of tobacco, from all quarters of the globe, is only about 14,000 hhds. per annum.

HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, October 27, 1829.

* Judge Cooper's Tract on the Tariff of 1824.

NO. 3.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS,

I take the liberty to repeat, what I have already stated in my first number, that these essays make no pretensions whatever to originality. They are merely a repetition of facts and arguments which I have already frequently advanced—but which have not had sufficient circulation to the south.

The third of the leading objections to the measure of protecting duties in favour of manufactures, is—

3. Its unconstitutionality.

It is among the wonders of the present day, that this objection has maintained its ground among enlightened citizens, notwithstanding the repeated presentations of the unequivocal declarations of the most illustrious members of the first congress, who not only admitted that the measure was constitutional, but advocated the exercise of it in the most zealous manner. In this congress there never was a single objection made to it as unconstitutional, by those opposed to many of its details, on the plea of inexpediency. This congress contained a number of the most leading members of the Federal Convention, who certainly were as competent to expound the instrument they had aided to form, as Judge Cooper, Mr. M'Duffie, Mr. Hayne, or Mr. Hamilton. One of these gentlemen, Mr. Hamilton, infers the unconstitutionality of protecting duties from the fact, that a proposition offered in the convention, to give *bounties* on manufactures, was rejected—and assumes, (how correctly the reader may judge,) that *protecting duties*, operating in the same manner as *bounties*, in fostering manufactures, were actually *bounties*. To prove the excessively illogical nature of this position, it may be stated, and justly stated, that if the inference were correct, then fish, flesh, fowl, vegetables, and drinks, all operating to support the human frame, must all be of one species.

I subjoin extracts from the debates in the first congress on the subject of the tariff.

Mr. Madison “moved to lay an impost of eight cents on all beer imported. He did not think this would give a monopoly; but hoped *it would be such an encouragement as to induce the manufacture to take deep root in every state in the union.*”—Lloyd's Debates of Congress, Vol. I. p. 65.

The same.—“The states that are most advanced in population, and *ripe for manufactures, ought to have their particular interests attended to in some degree.* While these states retained the power of making regulations of trade, they had the power to protect and cherish such institutions. By adopting the present constitution, they have thrown the exercise of this power into other hands: they must have done this with an expectation *that those interests would not be neglected here.*”—Idem, p. 24.

Mr. Clymer “did not object to this mode of encouraging manufactures, and obtaining revenue, by combining the two objects in one bill: *he was satisfied that a political necessity existed for both the one and the other.*”—Idem, p. 31.

Mr. C. "hoped gentlemen would be disposed to extend a degree of patronage to a manufacture [steel] which a moment's reflection would convince them was highly deserving protection."—Idem, p. 69.

Mr. Carroll "moved to insert *window and other glass*: a manufacture of this article was begun in Maryland, and attended with considerable success. *If the legislature was to grant a small encouragement, it would be permanently established.*"—Idem, p. 94.

Mr. Wadsworth.—"By moderating the duties, we shall obtain revenue, and give that ENCOURAGEMENT TO MANUFACTURES *which is intended.*"—Idem, p. 128.

Mr. Ames "thought this a useful and accommodating manufacture [nails] which yielded a clear gain of all it sold for, but the cost of the material; the labour employed in it would be thrown away probably in many instances. * * * He hoped the article would remain in the bill."—Idem, p. 81.

The same.—"The committee were already informed of the flourishing situation of the manufacture, [nails;] but they ought not to join the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Tucker,) in concluding that *it did not therefore deserve legislative protection*; he had no doubt but THE COMMITTEE WOULD CONCUR IN LAYING A SMALL PROTECTING DUTY IN FAVOUR OF THIS MANUFACTURE."—Idem, p. 82.

Mr. Fitzsimons "was willing to allow a small duty, because it was the policy of the states who thought it proper in this manner to protect their manufactures."—Idem, p. 83.

The same.—"It being my opinion that an enumeration of articles will tend to clear away difficulties, I wish as many to be selected as possible; for this reason I have prepared myself with an additional number: among these are some calculated to protect the productions of our country, and PROTECT OUR INFANT MANUFACTURES."—Idem, p. 17.

Mr. Hartley—"If we consult the history of the ancient world, [Europe,] we shall see that they have thought proper for a long time past to give great encouragement to establish manufactures by laying such partial duties on the importation of foreign goods as to give the home manufactures a considerable advantage in the price when brought to market. * * * I think it both politic and just, that the fostering hand of the general government should extend to all those manufactures which will tend to national utility. Our stock of materials is, in many instances, equal to the greatest demand, and our artizans sufficient to work them up, even for exportation. In those cases, I take it to be the policy of every enlightened nation to give their manufacturers the degree of encouragement necessary to perfect them, without oppressing the other parts of the community; and under this encouragement, the industry of the manufacturer will be employed to add to the wealth of the nation."—Idem, p. 22.

Mr. White.—"In order to charge specified articles of manufacture so as to encourage our domestic ones, it will be necessary to examine the present state of each throughout the Union."—Idem, p. 19.

Mr. Boudinot.—"I shall certainly move for it, [the article of glass,] as I suppose we are capable of manufacturing this as well as many others. In fact, it is well known, that we have and can do it as well as most nations; the materials being almost all produced in our country."—Idem, p. 28.

The same.—"Let us take then the resolution of congress in 1783, and make it the basis of our system, adding only SUCH PROTECTING DUTIES AS ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE MANUFACTURES ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE MANUFACTURING STATES."—Idem, p. 34.

Mr. Sinnickson "declared himself a friend to this manufacture, [beer,] and thought if the duty was laid high enough to effect a prohibition, the manufacture would increase, and of consequence the price be lessened."—Idem, p. 65.

Mr. Lawrence "thought that if candles were an object of considerable importation, they ought to be taxed for the sake of obtaining revenue; and if they were not imported in considerable quantities, the burden upon the consumer would be small, while it tended to cherish a valuable manufacture."—Idem, p. 68.

Mr. Fitzsimons "moved to lay a duty of two cents per pound on tallow candles. The manufacture of candles is an important manufacture, and far advanced to perfection. I have no doubt but in a few years we shall be able to supply the consumption of every part of the continent." *Mr. Fitzsimons* stated that Pennsylvania had imposed that duty, and added "under the operation of this small encouragement, the manufacture has gained considerable strength. * * * *It will be politic in the government of the United States to continue such duties until their object is accomplished.*"—*Idem*, p. 67.

The same. "Suppose five per cent. were imposed [on unwrought steel] it might be, as stated, a partial duty—but *would not the evil be soon overbalanced by the establishment of such an important manufacture?*" *Idem*, p. 69.

In addition to these extracts, I shall adduce, for the purpose of removing the doubts of the most sceptical, five corroborations from which there can be no appeal.

The first is the caption or heading of the first tariff act—the others are the explicit declarations of four of the most illustrious citizens of whom this country can boast, General Washington, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Lowndes, to which I add the corresponding sentiments of both houses of the congress of 1790–91.

"Whereas, it is necessary for the support of government—for the discharge of the debts of the United States—and the ENCOURAGEMENT and PROTECTION of manufactures, *that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported.*"—Laws of Congress, Vol. II. p. 2.

General Washington's speech to congress, of December, 1790, declares that—

"The safety and interest of a free people, require that congress should *promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies.*"

Extract from the reply of the senate—

"The necessity of accelerating the establishment of *certain useful branches of MANUFACTURES*, by the *intervention of legislative aid and PROTECTION*, and the encouragement due to agriculture by the creation of boards, (composed of intelligent individuals,) to patronize this primary pursuit of society, are subjects which will readily engage our most serious attention."

Extract from the reply of the house of representatives—

"We concur with you in the sentiment, that "*agriculture, commerce, and MANUFACTURES*, are entitled to LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION."

Again—General Washington's speech of 1796 explicitly holds out the same doctrine:—

"Congress have repeatedly, and not without success, directed their attention to the ENCOURAGEMENT OF MANUFACTURES. *The object is of too much importance not to insure a continuance of these efforts in every way which shall appear eligible.*"

Mr. Jefferson, in his message of 1802, states, that—

"To cultivate peace; maintain commerce and navigation; to foster our fisheries; and PROTECT MANUFACTURES, adapted to our circumstances, &c. are the land-marks by which to guide ourselves in all our relations."

Extract from the message of Mr. Madison, Nov. 5, 1811—

"A portion of your deliberations cannot but be well bestowed on THE JUST AND SOUND POLICY OF SECURING TO OUR MANUFACTURES THE SUCCESS THEY HAVE ATTAINED, and are still attaining under the influence of causes not permanent."

Extract from the message of Mr. Madison, Dec. 5, 1815—

"Under circumstances, giving powerful impulse to manufacturing industry, it has made among us a progress, and exhibited an efficiency, which justify the

belief, that with **A PROTECTION** *not more than is due to the enterprising citizens, whose interests are now at stake, it will become, at an early day, not only safe against occasional competitions from abroad—but a source of domestic wealth, and even of external commerce.* * * * In selecting the branches more especially entitled to public patronage, a preference is obviously claimed by such as will relieve the United States from a dependence on foreign supplies, ever subject to casual failures, for articles necessary for public defence, or connected with the primary wants of individuals. It will be an additional recommendation of *particular manufactures*, where the **MATERIALS FOR THEM ARE EXTENSIVELY DRAWN FROM OUR AGRICULTURE**, and consequently impart and insure to that great fund of national prosperity and independence, an encouragement which cannot fail to be rewarded."

Mr. Lowndes defended various items of the tariff bill of 1816—and voted for it on its final passage—together with Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Archer, and various other southern members:—

"Mr. Lowndes entered into an **AMPLE AND PARTICULAR DEFENCE OF THE SYSTEM REPORTED**, on the subject of cottons, by the committee of ways and means."—National Intelligencer, March 22, 1816.

"Mr. Lowndes observed, that he believed **THE MANUFACTURE OF WOOLLENS, AND PARTICULARLY OF BLANKETS, REQUIRED A DECIDED PRESENT ENCOURAGEMENT.**"—Idem, March 27, 1816.

Let me add the sentiments of Thomas Jefferson at an early period of our government, and I hope the reader will apply them to the case of the corn laws, not merely of Great Britain, but similar laws on the continent of Europe.

"Where a nation imposes high duties on our productions, or prohibits them altogether, it may be proper for us to do the same by theirs—first burdening or excluding those productions which they bring here in competition with our own of the same kind; selecting next, such manufactures as we take from them in greatest quantity, and which at the same time we could the soonest furnish to ourselves, or obtain from other countries; imposing on them duties light at first, but heavier and heavier afterwards, as other channels of supply open.

"Such duties, having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic manufactures of the same kind, may induce the manufacturer to come himself into these states, where cheaper subsistence, equal laws, and a vent for his ware, free of duty, may insure him the highest profits from his skill and industry. The oppressions of our agriculture in foreign parts would thus be made the occasion of relieving it from a dependence on the councils and conduct of others, and of promoting arts, manufactures, and population at home."*

Now, fellow citizens, let me hope you will lay aside prejudice on this subject, and ask yourselves this simple question,—is it to be admitted for a moment, that those who have laboured to inflame your passions, and to produce a state of excitement which might lead to that deplorable result, a separation of the Union, are more wise, or more safe guides, than the host of enlightened and patriotic citizens whose deliberate and reflected sentiments are enumerated in these pages? Was the wonderful discovery of the unconstitutionality of the protecting system hidden for thirty years from all our politicians and statesmen, and reserved for revelation in these latter days?

HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, October 30, 1829.

* Jefferson's Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the United States in Foreign Countries.

NO. 4.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS,

The fourth objection to the system of protecting manufactures by the imposition of duties on the importation of rival articles, is, that it “taxes the many for the benefit of the few,” by enabling the manufacturer to enhance his prices without the salutary control of adequate foreign competition.

I had made considerable progress in the refutation of this objection, when I recollected I had already so fully discussed the subject, that I preferred re-publishing a former essay to retailing the same ideas in a new one.

“I shall present the subject under two points of view, theoretically and practically—and trust I shall make it appear, that the objection is wholly unfounded on both grounds.

“Of the extraordinary talents of Alexander Hamilton, there is no second opinion in this country. Those who utterly disapproved his politics, always unhesitatingly admitted the powers of his mind. His opinions, so lucidly and convincingly delivered in favour of the protection of manufactures, are entitled to peculiar weight, from the circumstance that the manufacturers were generally hostile to his politics, and that his associations and friendships were chiefly with the mercantile class. He was, therefore, under no undue bias in favour of the former. In fact any bias under which he may be supposed to have laboured, would, according to the usual operation of the human passions and feelings, be in favour of his associates and political friends. This, I repeat, entitles his opinions on the subject of protection, to decided attention. These things premised, I proceed to submit his doctrine on this very important point, which I recommend to your most serious consideration.

“Though it were true, that the immediate and certain effect of regulations controlling the competition of foreign with domestic fabrics, was an increase of price, it is universally true, that the contrary is the ultimate effect with every successful manufacture. *When a domestic manufacture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in the prosecution of it a competent number of persons, it invariably becomes cheaper.* Being free from the heavy charges which attend the importation of foreign commodities, it can be afforded, and accordingly, seldom or never fails to be sold, cheaper in process of time, than was the foreign article for which it is a substitute. *The internal competition, which takes place, soon does away every thing like monopoly, and by degrees REDUCES THE PRICE OF THE ARTICLE TO THE MINIMUM OF A REASONABLE PROFIT ON THE CAPITAL EMPLOYED. This accords with the reason of the thing, and with experience.*

“Whence it follows, that it is the interest of a community, with a view to eventual and permanent economy, to encourage the growth of manufactures. *In a national view, A TEMPORARY ENHANCEMENT OF PRICE MUST*

ALWAYS BE WELL COMPENSATED BY A PERMANENT REDUCTION OF IT.”*

“Here is the theory—it will not be denied that it appears rational and conclusive. Let us see how far it has been established by experience and by facts; for without such corroboration, the theory, however plausible, would deservedly fall to the ground.

“The case of cotton goods has been adduced times without number—and is so cogent and convincing, that it ought to have finally settled the question long since. But as an objection, which has been often refuted, is as seriously alleged, and as firmly relied on as ever, I must avail myself of the corroborating facts once more, and hope to place the subject in a point of view somewhat new.

“The square yard duty on cottons, took place in 1816. Cotton was then twenty-seven cents per pound. The duty ranged from 40 to 100 per cent. on coarse muslins, of which, at that period, the amount of millions of dollars annually were imported, and sold at from 20 to 25 cents per yard, say an average of 22 cents. The article, although at so high a price, was of very inferior quality. An American substitute, allowed to be more than doubly valuable in point of durability, is now sold at 8 cents. The reduction has been gradual—from 25 cents to 21, to 18, 16, 13, 12, 10, and finally to 8.

“Now, fellow-citizens, I confess I am astonished how it is possible to resist the conviction arising from this fact. Your theory is, that high duties enhance prices—and, to repeat the trite phrase, ‘tax the many for the benefit of the few.’ And here is positive proof that the effect of the complete protection afforded by very high duties on cottons, has been to improve the quality 50 per cent., and reduce the price 60 per cent. Surely if inveterate prejudice did not bid defiance to reason, and argument, and fact, this case would carry complete conviction to the mind. The rival articles are heavily dutied—our own manufacturers have what is vulgarly but erroneously called ‘a monopoly’—and the result is, that reduction in price, and improvement in quality, have taken place—and, therefore, that the theory is proved to be destitute of foundation.

“But the inference here deduced, is triumphantly denied. It is asserted that the reduction of the price of the manufactured article is owing to the reduction of the raw material, from 27 cents in 1816, to an average of 10 cents at present. I hope to prove that this is an erroneous argument, and by no means enfeebles the inference from the facts in question. Let us see the operation of the reduction of the price of the raw material on

* Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, p. 66.

the price of one hundred pounds of cotton, and on that of four hundred yards of muslin, produced from that quantity of cotton.

100 pounds of cotton, in 1816, cost	- - - -	\$27 00
400 yards of imported muslin, at 25 cents, but say only 22, cost in the same year	- - - -	\$88 00
100 pounds of cotton, at 10 cents, cost, in 1829	- -	\$10 00
400 yards of muslin, at 8 cents	- . - -	\$32 00

“ Here we see that the reduction of the price of the raw material is only 17 dollars in 100 pounds weight—equal to about 4 cents in the quantity consumed in one yard; whereas the reduction of the price of the manufactured article, is no less than fifty-six dollars on 400 yards, or 14 cents per yard. Fellow citizens, I appeal to your honour to decide whether there ever was a more complete proof of the soundness of any doctrine than this affords of Alexander Hamilton’s theory, that ‘*the domestic competition reduces the price of the article to a minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed?*’

“ The reduction, it is true, is partly owing to the great improvement in our machinery, and in the skill of our artists. But this does not militate with the soundness of Hamilton’s theory. For if the opposing theory were correct, the capitalists would, by virtue of the so-styled ‘*monopoly*,’ avail themselves not merely of increased skill and improved machinery, but of the reduction of the price of the raw material, not to lower their goods, but merely to enhance their profits.

“ Nails afford another case strongly in point. The duty on them is 5 cents per lb. which is 45 per cent. of the price in Great Britain—and is almost prohibitory—as the whole amount imported in 1827, was only 502,457 lbs., value \$46,080, or about *nine cents per lb.*; and in 1828, only 40,048 lbs., costing \$4,525, or above *eight cents per lb.* Surely such a high duty, according to the doctrines of the enemies of protection, would enable and induce the domestic manufacturer of the article to avail himself of the ‘*monopoly*’ of the market, and to sell at least as high as the price in Great Britain. But what is the real state of the case? It proves Alexander Hamilton’s theory ‘true as the needle to the pole.’ So great is the ‘*domestic competition*,’ that nails are sold at $6\frac{1}{2}$ and 7 cents, and sometimes at 6 cents per lb. What reply can be made to this fact? The raw material here has not undergone any material reduction of price. Yet the ‘competition’ has reduced the price of the manufactured article to little more than the amount of the duty, or two-thirds of the price of the article in Great Britain—so low, in fact, as to afford little or no profit to the manufacturer.

“The case of white lead is equally striking.—It was sold before the adoption of the tariff of 1824, for 13 dollars per 100 pounds. But an increase of the duty of 33 per cent. by that tariff, has operated as a protection, and it is now sold at \$8.25, although the duty on the raw material has been raised from one dollar to three dollars per 100 pounds.

“Glauber’s salts, when imported, cost ten cents per lb. The price of the domestic manufacture is from a cent to a cent and a half per lb.—and for some years has not been above the latter price.

“Window glass, of the common quality, when imported, cost \$15 per 100 feet. It is now sold at five dollars, of the best quality: the duty is \$3 to \$5 per 100 feet.

“Oil of vitriol, previous to the manufacture in this country, often cost the importer 11 cents per lb. although free from duty; and was never sold under 7 cents per lb. previous to the tariff of 1824, by which a duty of three cents per lb. was imposed on it. It is now sold at $4\frac{1}{2}$ cents per lb. and has been sold for 3 cents.

“Refined saltpetre, when imported, cost about 10 cents per lb. Since it has been properly protected, it is sold for seven and a half cents.

“Copperas, when imported, was usually sold at five dollars per cwt. It is now fully protected, and is sold for two cents per lb.

“Who has forgotten the long debates on the subject of an increased duty on cotton-bagging, as ardent as if the fate of the southern states were at stake on the issue? It was asserted that it would enhance the price of the article so high, as to impose an extra tax on those states, of no less than \$250,000 per annum. Have these sombre predictions been realized? Has the price been raised? No—The price of cotton-bagging was, in 1824, about 26 or 27 cents per yard. It is now from 18 to 21 cents; and, had the protection been as complete as that of coarse cottons, the price, by the effect of domestic competition, would no doubt ere now have been reduced to 15 or 16 cents.

“On the subject of cotton-bagging and the effect of protecting duties—one important fact deserves attention. In the years 1821 and 1822, the manufacture of this article was prostrated in Kentucky—and the consequence was, that imported bagging rose to 40 a 50 cents per yard in 1822. In 1823 the Kentucky manufacture was revived, and reduced the price to 27 a 30 cents in that year. But for the revival in Kentucky, the high price would in all probability have continued.

“Fellow citizens, I have given you the authority of Alexander Hamilton for the truth of the maxim, that high duties, pro-

ducing domestic competition, insure a reduction of prices '*to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed.*' But as you may demur to his opinions, and regard them as out of date, I shall produce you an authority, which at present is of far more weight in the southern states. I mean Dr. Thomas Cooper, President of Columbia College, one of the leaders of the opposition to the system. He will satisfactorily prove to you, that his and your present alarms about 'the robbery to be perpetrated by an increase of duties,' are entirely unfounded. His dictum on the subject is not very ancient—for it was promulgated in the year 1824.

"The doctor refers to the case of cotton goods only; but it will be readily perceived, that the reasoning applies with equal force to every other species of manufactures.

"If cotton mills bring much greater than common profit, so many people will have cotton mills, that *in a year or two the profits will decrease to the common level.*"*

"Here is a sound, irrefragable position, which demands the deepest and most sober reflection. It cannot fail to produce a thorough conviction that the high degree of excitement which prevails to the south, is unwarranted. The doctor's position is precisely the maxim of Alexander Hamilton, merely modified in form. The latter states that high protecting duties will produce domestic competition, and that this '*competition reduces prices to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed.*' The former states that competition causes '*profits to decrease to the common level.*' And yet Dr. Cooper, in defiance of his own maxim, allows himself to be so far excited, as to threaten the government not very obscurely, with resistance, and separation, of which the inevitable attendant would be civil war, the most hideous evil of Pandora's box, if it dare to pursue a system of which he himself predicates such a favourable result!"

P. S. There is nothing so effectual to decide a mooted point, as cogent authenticated facts, strongly bearing on it—and I am happy to have it in my power to produce facts which fully support Alexander Hamilton's grand theory—that domestic "*competition reduces prices to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed.*"* Before the restrictive system, and the war, and the tariff of 1816, protected the manufacture of coarse cottons, the attempts to establish that important branch were almost universally abortive, and ruined the projectors, notwithstanding that we had the raw material in such superabundance that we supplied half of the entire consumption of the

* Tract on the alteration of the Tariff, by Thomas Cooper, M. D. 1824, p. 21.

civilized world. Where it did not actually perish, it was in a most sickly state. In the year 1810, we consumed but about 3,000,000 lbs. although we exported 92,261,462 lbs. The foreign cotton goods might be said to have an entire monopoly of the market. They were coarse, and of a very indifferent texture—and were, as I have stated, sold at 20, 22, 24, and 25 cents per yard. During the war, the manufacture was established on a large scale, and had surmounted the numerous difficulties to which all great undertakings are subject at their inception, but was prostrated by the extravagant importations of 1815 and 1816. The protection, afforded by the tariff of the latter year, revived it—and it is at present carried to such complete perfection that it is acknowledged that one yard of the domestic article is more valuable, in point of durability, than two yards of the imported. In order to show the immense advantage the domestic manufacture affords the purchaser, I subjoin a statement of the prices of the various articles of this manufacture from the Philadelphia Price Current of October 24, 1829.

DOMESTIC GOODS.

Shirting, brown, $\frac{3}{4}$ inf. yd. — 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—6	Drillings, unbleached, — 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—15
Do. do. fair, — 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ a—6 $\frac{1}{2}$	Plaids, $\frac{3}{4}$ inf. logwood, — 8 a— 9
Do. do. good, — 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ a—7	Do. $\frac{3}{4}$ fair, indigo, — 9 a—10
Do. do. 30 in. stout, 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—8	Do. $\frac{3}{4}$ good, do. — 11 a—12
Do. do. 32 in. good, 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ a—8	Do. 7-8 best, do. — 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—14
Bleached $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 cent per yard higher.	Nankeens, blue, 5 yds. by
Sheetings, brown, 36 to 37	28 inches, piece. 1 -- a—
inch, inferior, a 8—	Do. do. 10 by 13, 1 10 a 1 20
Do. do. do. fair, — 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ a— 9	Stripes, fast colours, — 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—20
Do. do. do. good, — 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ a— 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	Chambrays, -- 11 a--17
Do. do. do. sup'r. — 10 a—11	Drabbets, — 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ a--16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Do. do. do. very f. — 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—15	Denims, — 12 a—15
Do. do. 5-4 good, — 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ a—15	Millinets, — 62 $\frac{1}{2}$ a--82 $\frac{1}{2}$
Do. do. 6-4 sup'r. — 18 a—	Satinets, — 40 a 1 --
The same goods bleached, 1 to 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Checks, $\frac{3}{4}$, — 9 a—11
cent advance.	— 4-4, — 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ a--16
Ticking, $\frac{3}{4}$ common, — 9 a—11	— 4-4, fine, -- 17 a--22
Do. 7-8 good — 12 a—16	Cot'n Y'rn, No. 5 a 10, lb. 18 a—19
Do. 7-8 superior, — 17 a—21	Do. do. No. 20, (rising
Do. 4-4 good, — 22 a—26	1 cent per No.) cash, 20 a—
Do. 4-4 superior, — 32 a—40	

Let us see the operation on 100 yards of the article as imported in 1812, and 100 yards of the domestic manufacture.

100 yards in 1812, of East India, at 22 cents, . . . \$22 00

100 yards, 30 inches wide, stout, at 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ a 8 cents, say 8, - 8 00

Assuming, that the domestic goods are doubly valuable from their superior durability, it appears that eight cents at present produce as much value to the consumer as 44 in 1812!

If reason, and facts, and experience were allowed their due

weight in times of effervescence, when the public mind has been for a long time worked up to a high degree of passion and prejudice, these facts ought to tranquillize our southern fellow citizens, convince them how egregiously they have been mistaken, and convert their deadly hostility towards, into a warm support of, a system productive of such beneficial results.

HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, October 31, 1829.

NO. 5.

I pledged myself to undertake to prove that—

“The distress and ruin experienced in the south, have arisen from the system of policy, so ardently supported by the southern states themselves, and which, by their support, prevailed until 1824.

I will assume as postulata—

1. That an undue increase of the quantity of any article depresses the price, and, with scarcely an exception, in a ratio far beyond the ratio of increase; so that an increase of the quantity ten per cent. may, and frequently does, decrease the price 30, 40, or 50 per cent.

2. That the increase of the production of cotton in, and export from, this country has glutted all the markets of the world, so as to reduce the price of uplands from 32 cents per pound in 1818, to 9 a 12, in 1829, and been the great cause of the distress in the cotton-growing states.

3. That the chief cause of this undue and impolitic increase of production has been the unprofitableness of other agricultural labour, which has driven great numbers of farmers to the raising of cotton.

Now, these positions being admitted—and I trust they will not be denied—if I prove that our policy has steadily tended to increase the number of farmers—to diminish their markets—of course to render farming unprofitable, and to convert farmers into cotton planters—it will follow, as a corollary, that the distress experienced in the southern states, through the depression of the price of their grand staple, has arisen from that policy.

It is a fact of public notoriety, that the want of protection of manufactures by our government spread desolation and bankruptcy among the manufacturers in 1816, and for six successive years—that their factories were sold for a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, or an eighth part of the cost, and that thousands of operatives were thrown out of employment. Of these a large proportion “*went back*,” as was the favourite phrase, and became farmers, thus converting the valuable customers of the farming class into formidable rivals. Hence the depression of the farming interest—the glut of the markets with grain and other farming articles—the pernicious reduction of the value of lands—and the necessity that drove farmers in North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and other parts of the country, to become cotton-planters.

There are no data by which to ascertain the extent of the deprivation of employment of the operatives generally—but fortunately we have two documents to prove how pernicious its

effects were in Philadelphia and Pittsburg—and it is not unfair to conclude that the evil was felt proportionably elsewhere.

The year 1819 will be long remembered in the annals of this country as signally calamitous. Intense distress prevailed almost universally, the obvious consequence of the extravagant importations of the four preceding years, amounting to the enormous sum of \$400,000,000. An inquiry was instituted in Philadelphia in order to compare the number of operatives employed in that year, with those employed in 1816. It appeared that in thirty branches, there had been employed in 1816, no less than 9672 persons—whereas in 1819, there were but 2137 employed in those branches, making a diminution of 7435 persons.* There were 26 other branches, from which no information was procured, viz. bookbinders, brewers, brickmakers, carpenters, coopers, chocolate makers, calico printers, curriers, chair makers, dyers, engravers, embroiderers, glovers, glass manufacturers, manufacturers of gunpowder, painters and glaziers, plumbers, shoemakers, sugar-bakers, shot-makers, snuff and tobacco manufacturers, stone-cutters, turners, tanners, umbrella-makers, wheelwrights, &c. Suppose that only half the number were divested of employment in those branches, it would make an aggregate of 11,000 persons with their families in one city.

The persons deprived of employment in Pittsburg, within the same space of time, amounted to 1288. Several thousands were reduced to the same situation in Rhode Island.

I trust that it does not require an extraordinary degree of candour to admit, that this state of things, which extended throughout the middle and eastern states, with more or less of its hurricane ravages, satisfactorily accounts for the depression of farming. Had all these persons been exiled, and thus withdrawn from the demand for the products of agriculture, the injury to the latter interest would have been severe—but, converted from consumers into producers, the system was doubly pernicious, and operated as a two-edged sword on that great leading interest. Hence it follows that a policy, intended for the peculiar benefit of agriculture, and to enable farmers and planters to purchase cheap imported goods, was the *bohon upas* of their prosperity. Our statesmen, who all professed to be warm admirers of Adam Smith, disregarded incomparably the best maxim in his work—a maxim, so far as regards this country, worth all the rest of it

* Some idea may be formed of the destructive nature of the policy by which so large a portion of the operatives of the United States, were divested of employment, by stating that the wages of those thus circumstanced in Philadelphia alone, amounted to probably \$60,000 per week, equal to about \$3,000,000 per annum. Supposing their productions to be only double the amount of their wages, it would be an injury to the amount of \$6,000,000 per annum to a single city.

—but which has been reiterated, times without number, to no purpose.

“Whatever tends to DIMINISH, IN ANY COUNTRY, THE NUMBER OF ARTIFICERS AND MANUFACTURERS, TENDS TO DIMINISH THE HOME MARKET, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL MARKETS FOR THE RUDE PRODUCE OF THE LAND, AND THEREBY STILL FURTHER TO DISCOURAGE AGRICULTURE.”—Wealth of Nations, Hartford edition, vol. 2, p. 149.

That our policy has, until the adoption of the tariff of 1824, uniformly tended “*to diminish the number of artificers and manufacturers*”—that it has, of course, “*diminished the home market,*” and thereby “*discouraged agriculture,*” in all its shapes and forms; farming first of all, by increasing production, and diminishing the markets; and then cotton and tobacco planting, by crowding on them the superfluous farmers, I trust will not be controverted.

The immense extent of the cotton lands of this country would produce a great increase of the article, let us pursue what policy we might—but the increase under a sound policy would have been gradual, and only kept pace with the increase of consumption. But the hot-bed system we pursued, by creating an undue increase of cultivators, has been fraught with ruin, and is the cause of the calamitous state of affairs depicted so feelingly and so forcibly by Mr. Carter, a member of congress from South Carolina.

“In the south, the prostration of their foreign markets has spread over the face of the country a general pervading gloom. In all that region which stretches itself from the shores of the Potomac to the gulf of Mexico, where all the arts of civilized life once triumphed, the arm of industry is now paralyzed. *Large and ample estates, once the seats of opulence, which supported their proprietors in affluence and comfort, are now thrown out to waste and decay.*”

The distress is depicted in equally strong terms by the Charleston Chamber of Commerce:

“*Property of all kinds has depreciated beyond example. A feeling of gloom and despondence is beginning to prevail every where in the lower counties. ESTATES ARE SACRIFICED TO PAY THE LAST INSTALMENTS ON THE BONDS GIVEN FOR THE PURCHASE MONEY. NOBODY SEEMS DISPOSED TO BUY WHAT EVERY BODY IS ANXIOUS TO SELL AT ANY PRICE.*”

Against the miserable system of glutting the markets with our cotton, the Liverpool and London merchants have from year to year in vain entered their protest. I have now before me scores of circulars, from 1821 to 1829, in which the most cogent admonitions are held out on this subject. My limits forbid any extensive quotations from them. I shall therefore confine myself to six or seven.

“*While the imports continue to exceed the consumption, great as it is, THE PRICES MUST CONTINUE TO DECLINE; and will no doubt become so low as to cease to remunerate the planter for the expenses of production—and thereby to diminish the future growth.*”—Bolton, Ogden, & Co. Liverpool, Jan. 13, 1821.

"As there appears to be too much cotton grown, it becomes doubtful if prices will improve, **UNLESS THE PRODUCE IS DIMINISHED**, and time alone can show how far the present reduced rates may have that effect, or tend to keep back supplies."—*Morrall, Watson, & Co. Liverpool, Jan. 13, 1821.*

"As regards the new crop, *almost every thing as to price, must depend upon its extent in America.* * * If your crop cannot be increased beyond the produce of the last crop, the consumption will, in all probability, as far as American cotton is concerned, soon overtake the supply; in which event, *an important advance might be reasonably calculated on.*"—*Curwen & Hagerty, Liverpool, Nov. 1, 1822.*

"While this excess of supply continues, **PRICES MUST BE VERY LOW**; and it is rational to expect that a reduction must take place in the United States, corresponding with the rates paid in this country."—*Yates, Brothers & Co. Jan. 30, 1821.*

A letter from London, dated September 6, 1822, after stating the increase of consumption, and the reduction of the stock on hand, goes on to state—

"These circumstances would lead to early and material improvements in price, were it not for the large quantities pressed on the market by American importers in most rapid succession, *quantities which destroy all confidence in the article, and prevent all speculation.* * * The only effectual security for the future is a larger stock on your side, and **THE CESSATION OF SHIPMENTS WHICH PRODUCE SO GREAT, SO OVERWHELMING A PRESSURE ON THIS.**"

"It has been matter of considerable astonishment to us, that American cottons have continued to arrive, *bought at high prices, compared with what they will bring here,* and in the face of the discouraging accounts from this during the whole year. We are decidedly of opinion, that *we cannot look for any permanent or considerable improvement in the article, until the prices get so low with you that* **THE PLANTERS HAVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO EXTEND THEIR CULTIVATION.**"—*W. & J. Brown, Liverpool, Aug. 8, 1822.*

"The cotton market has been exceedingly flat and heavy during the past month. The new crop from the United States having made its appearance in quantity unusually early this season, and an anxious desire to sell having been evinced, the dealers and spinners have seen in these circumstances a sufficient motive to induce them to purchase as sparingly as possible; the Manchester trade may be said, perhaps, to have been rather duller than usual at this season of the year: and the slight alarm which has occasionally been excited in the money market, arising from the failure of some banking establishments in London, may have contributed to the disinclination to do much. *But the main cause of depression has been the early and* **COMPARATIVELY ABUNDANT ARRIVALS OF THE NEW CROP, connected with the strong desire to sell.** Cropper, Benson & Co., First Month, 1st, 1829.

Cropper and Benson, in a general circular of September 27, 1822, after commenting on the effect of glutted markets, state, that if either less cotton were raised, or more consumed at home, the planters "**MIGHT SELL THEIR COTTON AT ANY PRICE.**"

Similar admonitions and exhortations have been urged on the southern planters by the enlightened merchants of Liverpool, from time to time, since that period. But it has been like preaching to the winds and waves. The export has regularly increased from year to year, with the exception of 1824 and 1828. Production has constantly overrun consumption—and glutted markets, and reduced prices have been, as is eternally the case, the certain consequence. To trace the sufferings of

the southern states to the tariff, or to any other cause than over production, is about as wise as the practice in Scotland, for years after the union, to charge all the evils that occurred to that obnoxious measure. This was carried so far that we are told that an old woman having fallen down and broken her leg, cried out, “——’s curse on the union, there’s been ne luke nor grace in the land since it took place.”

I cannot help flattering myself into the opinion, that I have made out my case, and have proved the utter, the dire impolicy of the system to which the southern planters have clung with the grasp of death, and which has rendered (a mere drug in all the markets of the world,) one of the most valuable gifts of nature; perhaps the most valuable, iron excepted: which has blasted, and withered, and blighted the prosperity and happiness of one of the fairest portions of the country—a system, the advocates of which utterly disregarded the admonitory fable of the belly and the members—a system, in fine, which, while it devoted so large a portion of the manufacturing class to destruction, from 1816 to 1824, ultimately recoiled on its supporters with equal violence.

HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, Oct. 31, 1829.

NO. 6, AND LAST.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS,

I proceed to exhibit certain tabular statements, intimately connected with, and confirming the positions in my last number.

Import and consumption of Cotton in Great Britain for eleven Years.

	United States. Bales.	Brazil. Bales.	All other sorts. Bales.	Total. Bales.	Consump- tion. Bales.	Stock at the end of the year.
1818	206,400	160,200	301,900	673,033	424,000	297,500
1819	205,010	125,090	214,780	545,895	425,540	350,340
1820	301,650	179,910	89,163	571,656	488,030	404,730
1821	301,137	122,309	67,177	491,572	486,473	356,300
1822	328,274	144,552	59,052	533,036	541,690	286,434
1823	448,307	148,511	71,589	668,428	535,656	383,393
1824	282,460	142,559	115,579	540,976	636,401	235,300
1825	422,912	196,470	200,354	821,286	564,487	415,500
1826	394,637	56,249	129,395	581,872	551,453	342,306
1827	646,927	84,828	74,587	894,107	681,000	446,825
1828	443,710	163,902	107,156	749,254	— —*	405,866

This table fully proves that it is our cotton that gluts the British market; and the same is of course to be presumed of all other markets.

Our average export to Great Britain, for 1818, 19, 20, 21,	
and 22, was	bales. 268,494
For 1823, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, was	439,822

Making an annual increase of	171,328
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The average from Brazils, for 1818, 19, 20, 21, and 22, was	146,412
The average for 1823, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, was	132,358

Annual decrease,	14,054
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The average from all other parts of the world, for 1818, 19, 20,	
21, and 22, was	146,414
For 1823, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8,	121,835

Annual decrease,	24,579
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It is not wonderful that the price has been, and has continued, reduced, when it appears that there is generally on hands a full supply for seven or eight months. At the close of the year 1827, there was a full supply for eight months.

* This blank I have no means of filling up.

Details of the Produce of the Cotton Crop of the United States for 1826 and 1827.

	1826.	1827.
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Upper Alabama, and Arkansas, - - - - -	251,959	336,870
Lower Alabama, - - - - -	74,201	89,707
Florida, - - - - -		4,163
Georgia, - - - - -	190,592	233,920
South Carolina, - - - - -	111,978	179,810
North Carolina and Virginia, - - - - -	88,480	112,811
	717,210	957,281

From this it appears that the produce of Virginia and North Carolina, where formerly cotton was scarcely ever raised for exportation, was greater in 1827 than that of South Carolina in 1826, and will continue to increase in those states; for low as is the price, it remunerates better than the culture of grain, at the present prices. This, I repeat, and it cannot be too often repeated, is the necessary result of the depression, first of manufactures, and then of farming.

Although no certain inference of the general proportion between the crop of North Carolina and South Carolina and Georgia, can be drawn from the imports from these states into the port of New York, still those imports may afford some approximation to that proportion. They may, therefore, be worth some attention. It appears that the imports into New York, in the year 1828, from North Carolina, were not far from double those from South Carolina, and more than half of those from South Carolina and Georgia:—

Cotton imported into New York in the year 1828, from North Carolina, - - - - -	bales. 31,022
From South Carolina, - - - - -	17,440
From South Carolina and Georgia, - - - - -	57,729

I trust I am safe in saying that, but for the depression of farming, the obvious result of the cruel policy of our government towards the manufacturers from 1816 to 1824, the export of cotton from North Carolina would not have amounted to a fifth part of what is stated above.

*Quantity and Value of the Exports of Cotton from the United States for ten Years,
from the Treasury Returns.*

	lbs.	\$
1819	87,997,045	21,081,769
1820	127,860,152	22,308,667
1821	121,893,405	20,157,484
1822	144,675,095	24,035,053
1833	172,723,270	20,445,520
1824	142,369,653	21,947,401
1825	176,450,457	a bubble
1826	204,535,415	35,025,214
1827	284,300,115	29,359,545
1828	210,590,463	22,487,229

This table ought to be studied with intense interest, particularly by those desirous to promote the prosperity of the southern states. It sheds strong rays of light on the pernicious tendency of our policy, and proves the soundness of the policy of Holland respecting the spice trade, which carefully guarded against glutted markets. It appears—

1. That the increase of export in 1820, was nearly 40,000,000 lbs., whereas the increased amount of the proceeds was only \$1,200,000.

2. That the increase in 1823, was 28,000,000 lbs., whereas the proceeds fell short of the preceding year, \$3,500,000.

3. That the decrease, in 1824, of 30,000,000 lbs. raised the price so much that 140,000,000 lbs. produced \$1,500,000 more in that year, than 170,000,000 in 1823.

4. That the export in 1826, was 52,000,000 lbs. more than in 1824, whereas the increase in the amount was only \$3,000,000.

5. That the export increased in four years, from 1819 to 1823, above 84,000,000 lbs., whereas the proceeds fell short \$600,000.

6. That from 1819, the export increased nearly 200,000,000 lbs., that is, more than trebled, whereas the proceeds, in 1827, increased only \$8,000,000, or about 40 per cent.

7. That an increase of 80,000,000 lbs., in 1827, produced an increase of only \$4,000,000, equal to about 5 cents per lb.

8. That increasing the quantity has in all cases reduced the price, and in some instances reduced the total amount, as in the year 1823.

9. That a decrease of the quantity has sometimes increased the proceeds, as in the case of 1824.

10. That for 210,590,463 lbs., in 1828, we received but little more than for 142,369,653 lbs. in 1824.

Although the whole of this table is fraught with instruction, there is one particular item which speaks louder and more con-

vincingly than the rest. The export from this country, in the year 1824, fell short about 30,000,000 lbs. of that of 1823—and in the early part of the year 1825, the impression in that country was general, that the export of 1825 would not exceed that of 1824. This was the grand cause of the exorbitant rise of price that took place from week to week as long as the delusion lasted. But as soon as it was dispelled, and it was found that there was a great increase, the speculators forced the article on the market, and every one knows the result. It cannot be doubted, that had the crop of that year really fallen short 30,000,000 of lbs. or had that quantity been by any means withheld from the market, the price would have never sunk probably below a shilling per lb. for Uplands—and thus two-thirds of the calamity that befel the two countries would have been avoided. So much for the policy of the southern states, contrasted with the well-known policy of Holland.

HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, Nov. 2, 1829.

APPENDIX.

A.

Principles of Political Economy. Extracted from the prospectus of the Philadelphia Emporium, in 1813, edited by THOMAS COOPER, M. D. then Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, now President of Columbia College, S. C.

1st. Our population is becoming scattered over such an extent of territory, that the nation is really weakened by it. Defence is more difficult and expensive. Active hostility almost impossible. The communication of society, and of course of knowledge, is greatly retarded. Many of our citizens are tempted to live in a half savage state. And even the administration of law, and the maintenance of order and necessary subordination, is rendered imperfect, tardy, and expensive.

2dly. OUR AGRICULTURISTS WANT A HOME MARKET. MANUFACTURES WOULD SUPPLY IT. AGRICULTURE, AT GREAT DISTANCES FROM SEAPORTS, LANGUISHES FOR WANT OF THIS. Great Britain exhibits an instance of unexampled power and wealth by means of an agriculture greatly dependent on a system of manufactures—and her agriculture, thus situated, is the best in the world, though still capable of great improvement.

3dly. We are too much dependent upon Great Britain for articles that habit has converted into necessaries. A state of war demands privations that a large portion of our citizens reluctantly submit to. HOME MANUFACTURES WOULD GREATLY LESSEN THE EVIL.

4thly. *By means of debts incurred for foreign manufactures, we are almost again become colonists*—we are too much under the influence, indirectly, of British merchants and British agents. We are not an independent people.—*Manufactures among us would tend to correct this*, and give a stronger tone of nationality at home. I greatly value the intercourse with that country of pre-eminent knowledge and energy; but our dependence upon it is often so great, as to be oppressive to ourselves.

5thly. *The state of agriculture would improve with the improvement of manufactures*, by means of the general spirit of energy and exertion, which *no where exists in so high a degree as in a manufacturing country*; and by the general improvement of machinery, and the demand for raw materials.

6thly. The introduction of manufactures would extend knowledge of all kinds, particularly scientific. The elements of natural philosophy and of chemistry, now form an indispensable branch of education among the manufacturers of England. They cannot get on without it. They cannot understand or keep pace with the daily improvements in manufactures without scientific knowledge; and scientific knowledge is not insulated; it must rest upon previous learning. The tradesmen of Great Britain at this day, can furnish more profound thinkers on philosophical subjects, more acute and accurate experimenters, more real philosophers, three told, than all Europe could furnish a century ago. I wish that were the case here; but it is not so. I fear it is not true, that we are the most enlightened people upon the face of the earth; unless the facility of political declamation be the sole criterion of decision, and the universal test of talent. We should greatly improve, in my opinion, by a little more attention to mathematical and physical science; I would therefore encourage whatever would introduce a general taste for such pursuits.

7thly. *Because the home trade, consisting in the exchange of agricultural surpluses for articles of manufacture, produced in our own country, will, for a long time to come, furnish the safest and the least dangerous, the least expensive and*

the least immoral—the most productive and the most patriotic employment of surplus capital, however raised and accumulated. The safest, because it requires no navies exclusively for its protection; the least dangerous, because it furnishes no excitement to the prevailing madness of commercial wars; the least expensive, for the same reason that it is the safest and the least dangerous; the least immoral, because it furnishes no temptation to the breach or evasion of the laws; to the multiplication of oaths and perjuries; and to the consequent prostration of all religious feeling, and all social duty: the most productive, because the capital admits of quicker returns; because the whole of the capital is permanently invested and employed at home; because it contributes, directly, immediately, and wholly, to the internal wealth and resources of the nation; because the credits given, are more easily watched, and more effectually protected by our own laws, well known, easily resorted to, and speedily executed, than if exposed in distant and in foreign countries, controlled by foreign laws and foreign customs, and at the mercy of foreign agents; the most patriotic, because it binds the persons employed in it, by all the ties of habit and of interest to their own country; while FOREIGN TRADE TENDS TO DENATIONALIZE THE AFFECTIONS OF THOSE WHOSE PROPERTY IS DISPERSED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, whose interests are connected with foreign interests, whose capital is but partially invested at the place of their domicile, and who can remove with comparative facility from one country to another. The wise man observed of old, that “where the treasure is, there will the heart be also.” And time has not detracted from the truth of the remark.

*Nor can there be any fear that for a century to come, there will not be full demand produced by a system of home manufacture, for every particle of surplus produce that agriculture can supply. Consider for a moment what are the articles that may fairly be regarded as of the first necessity, that an agricultural capitalist will require either to conduct his business or for his reasonable comforts. 1st. The iron manufacture in all its branches, from the ore to the boiling pans, the grate, the stove, the tire, the ploughshare, the spade, the scythe, the knife and fork, the sword and the gun; the copper manufacture, for his distilling vessels; for the bolts and sheathing of ships: the lead manufacture, for his paints and his shot: the tin manufacture, for his kitchen utensils: the manufacturing of powder for blasting and for fire-arms: he cannot dispense with the wheel-wright, the mill-wright, the carpenter, the joiner, the tanner, the currier, the saddler, the potter, the glass-maker, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dyer, the shoemaker, the hatter, the maker of machines and tools, and very many trades and handicrafts not enumerated. Of all these occupations, every one of which may be employed in furnishing articles either of immediate necessity, of reasonable want, or of direct connexion with agriculture, we have in abundance the raw materials of manufacture; and the raw material, uninstructed man, to manufacture them. Is it to be pretended that these occupations, when fully under way at home, will not furnish a market for the superfluous produce of agriculture, provided that produce be, as it necessarily will be, suited to the demand? Or ought this variety of occupation, and above all, the mass of real knowledge it implies, to be renounced and neglected for the sake of foreign commerce—that we may not interfere with the profits and connexions of the merchants who reside among us; and that we may be taxed, and tolerated, and licensed to fetch from abroad, what we can, with moderate exertion, supply at home? And yet this is the doctrine, not merely advocated and recommended among us, but likely to become the fashionable creed of political economy, wherever mercantile interests and connexions prevail. It appears to me of national importance to counteract these notions. * * * * **

As a means of national defence and national independence—as a means of propagating among our citizens the most useful and practical kinds of knowledge—as a means of giving that energetic, frugal, calculating, and foreseeing character to every branch of our national industry, that does not exist but among a manufacturing people—as a means of multiplying our social enjoy-

ments by condensing our population—and a means of fixing the consumers and the producers in the immediate neighbourhood of each other—I would encourage the commencement, at least, of home manufacture. Not the manufacture of gold and silver—not the velvets of Lyons or the silks of Spitalfields—the laces of Brussels, and the lawns of Cambray—not the clinquaille and bijouterie of Paris and Birmingham, but such as we feel the want of in time of war; such as may fairly be regarded as of prime necessity, or immediately connected with agricultural wants and pursuits.

8thly. I would remark, that nature seems to have furnished the materials of manufacture more abundantly in Pennsylvania in particular, than in any country I know of. *The very basis of all profitable manufacture, is plenty of fuel, easily, cheaply, and permanently procurable: the next desirable object is plenty of iron ore; iron being the article upon which every other manufacture depends.* It is to the plentiful distribution of these two commodities, that Great Britain is chiefly indebted for the pre-eminence of her manufactures and her commerce. I have not a doubt on my mind, but both pit coal and iron ore are more plentifully distributed in Pennsylvania than in Great Britain; and that both the one and the other can be gotten at more easily and cheaply in this country than in that. Moreover we have a decided superiority in the raw materials of cotton, hemp, and flax; in our alkalies for glass works; in the hides and the tanning materials of the leather manufactory: and we can easily procure that advantage, so far at least, as our own consumption requires it, in the woollen manufactory. Other branches might be enumerated wherein our advantages of internal resource are undeniable; but I cannot see why we should neglect or despise these. *Nothing but a stimulus is wanted to induce and enable us to make a proper use of our domestic riches.* But men of skill and men of capital fear to begin; lest, **ON THE RETURN OF PEACE, THEY SHOULD BE EXPOSED, IN THE WEAKNESS AND INFANCY OF THEIR UNDERTAKING, TO CONTENT WITH THE OVERWHELMING CAPITAL AND SKILL OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS, PARTICULARLY OF GREAT BRITAIN.**

For these reasons, I think it would be expedient so far to aid the introduction of manufactures in this country, by protecting duties, as to afford a reasonable prospect of safety to the prudent investment of capital, and the industrious pursuit of business; but no bounty to wild speculation, to negligent workmanship, or to smuggling.

THOMAS COOPER.

Carlisle, Feb. 1813.

B.

The following statement of the deleterious effects of the “liberal system,” adopted in Holland, in 1816, on the prosperity of that country—extracted from “*Considerations sur le projet de loi, concernant le nouveau systeme financier de Pays bas, a Bruxelles, June, 1821,*” holds out the most cogent admonitions to our statesmen, and fully confirms the soundness of the doctrines of the school of Alexander Hamilton.

“Our people are in the most unfortunate situation for want of work; as it appears, from authentic documents, submitted to the States General, that *one ninth part of the most industrious nation in the world, passionately devoted to labour, is reduced to the abject state of mendicity*, or to solicit aid to support their existence; that a still more numerous part, the middle and working class, is circumscribed to the consumption of mere necessities; and that manufactures and commerce being in a languishing condition, the profits of persons who follow those two branches of industry, are insignificant.

“It is the tariff of 1816, which has opened the door to the productions of foreign industry. *From that period, there has been a constant deficiency in our finances*; because the working classes, deprived of wages, have been obliged to diminish their consumption of the articles subject to the excise and impost—and because the manufacturers, the merchants, and the traders, deprived of

the profit which they derived from the disbursement of the most part of these wages, have likewise been obliged to diminish their consumption. c

"It is since 1816, that the ninth part of the nation is reduced either to mendicity, or to require assistance [for support].

"It is since 1816, that manufactures and commerce have declined with giant strides.

"It is ascertained that the immense number of breweries and distilleries, which formerly existed in both parts of the kingdom, have undergone prodigious diminution.

"Since the tariff of 1816 has permitted the entry of Scotch stockings and thules under light duties—and since the English thules have almost annihilated our flourishing fabrics of lace, there is good reason to believe, that those poor women earn at present but four sous per day."

C.

Russia was prosperous in 1816, 17, 18, and 19; but, fascinated with the theories of Adam Smith and J. B. Say, she adopted a new tariff in 1818, on the delusive plan of letting trade regulate itself.*—In this tariff she abrogated her prohibitions, and lowered her duties. The country was immediately deluged with foreign goods, and in due course, drained of its specie, as we have been in past years, to pay for the surplus of those imports, which far exceeded its exports. The most disastrous consequences took place. Circulation was stopped. Distress and wretchedness overspread the land. The manufacturers, as was the case in this country, first fell victims to this mistaken policy. Agriculture next felt the shock; and finally, bankruptcy swept away a large proportion of those commercial houses whose cupidity had paved the way for the misery of their country.

The following statement of the sufferings of the country is taken from a circular of the emperor of Russia, signed by Count Nesselrode:—

"To produce happy effects, the principles of commercial freedom must be generally adopted. The state which adopts, whilst others reject them, must condemn its own industry and commerce to pay a ruinous tribute to those of other nations.

"From a circulation exempt from restraint, and the facility afforded by reciprocal exchanges, almost all the governments at first resolved to seek the means of repairing the evil which Europe had been doomed to suffer; but experience, and more correct calculations, because they were made from certain data, and upon the results already known, of the peace that had just taken place, forced them soon to adhere to the prohibitory system.

"England preserved hers. Austria remained faithful to the rule she had laid down, to guard herself against the rivalry of foreign industry. France, with the same views, adopted the most rigorous measures of precaution. And Prussia published a new tariff in October last, which proves that she found it impossible not to follow the example of the rest of Europe.

"In proportion as the prohibitory system is extended and rendered perfect in other countries, that state which pursues the contrary system makes from day to day sacrifices more extensive and more considerable. *** It offers a continual encouragement to the manufactures of other countries—and its own manufactures perish in the struggle which they are as yet unable to maintain.

"It is with the most lively feelings of regret we acknowledge it is our own proper experience which enables us to trace this picture. The evils which it details, have been realized in Russia and Poland since the conclusion of the act of the 7-19 of December, 1818.* AGRICULTURE WITHOUT A MARKET, INDUSTRY WITHOUT PROTECTION, LANGUISH AND DECLINE. SPECIE IS EXPORTED, AND THE MOST SOLID COMMERCIAL HOUSES ARE SHAKEN. The public prosperity would soon feel the wound

* The tariff did not go into operation till 1820.

inflicted on private fortunes, if new regulations did not promptly change the actual state of affairs.

"Events have proved that our AGRICULTURE and our COMMERCE, as well as our MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, are not only paralyzed, BUT BROUGHT TO THE BRINK OF RUIN."

D.

Report of the Committee of Agriculture of the House of Representatives of the United States, composed of Messrs. Van Rensselaer, Baylies, Garnet, Harris, Pa., Rose, Patterson, Pa., and Whitman.

In the House of Representatives, March 19, 1824.

The committee on agriculture, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives, instructing them to inquire if an increase of the duty now established by law on any article of foreign growth or manufacture, will be for the interest of the agriculturist; and, if there be any such article, to name the same, together with the additional amount of duty which they deem beneficial to the agricultural interest, respectfully submit the following report:

That, in the apprehension of your committee, *whatever increases the consumption of its products, whether at home or abroad, necessarily advances the interest of agriculture.* He who cultivates the soil, looks beyond the supply of his own wants for the profits of his labour. He looks to a market for the surplus products of his industry. **THE HOME MARKET, IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE, IS AT ALL TIMES TO BE PREFERRED TO THE FOREIGN MARKET,** when the reward of agricultural pursuits is equal; the former is less precarious than the latter; it is, also, *more permanent and certain, and above the reach of restraining and prohibitory duties of foreign hostility;* and when the home market can be increased in its demands, without diminishing in a greater degree the foreign consumption, it would seem wise and prudent to promote its extension by every rational means within the sphere of legislation.

Your committee consider the increase of duties on many foreign articles now imported into the United States, would *promote the agricultural prosperity of the nation.* A portion of population engaged in manufactures would necessarily depend on the former for subsistence, and create *a more perfect and profitable division of labour than now exists.* **A NEW MARKET WOULD BE OPENED, AND A NEW DEMAND CREATED, FOR ALL THE RAW MATERIALS WHICH NEW MANUFACTURES WOULD CONSUME.** It cannot be denied, that if all the manufactured articles now consumed by the people of the United States, were manufactured within the bounds of our country, from the raw materials furnished by ourselves, **THE VALUE OF OUR LANDS WOULD BE INCREASED, AND THE PROFITS OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR CONSIDERABLY AUGMENTED.** Demand and consumption would be directly extended—a great extent of soil devoted to the growing of products that now afford no sufficient stimulus to cultivation. The soil and climate of the United States are capable of producing the various articles necessary for such manufacturing establishments as will most naturally flourish in this country, and of such as would inevitably be consumed, provided manufacturing labour should be extended. By a comprehensive and rigorous system of policy, calculated to unfold our agricultural resources, a spirit of emulation and industry would be diffused over the land; *a vast and active system of internal exchange would rise up; the expense of transportation in heavy articles would be, in a great measure, saved;* and, in fact, that which should be ardently wished for, in every agricultural country, *a home market would appear;* this, too, would prove a market at once various, in point of demand, but *sure, steady and unchanging.* **THE POLICY, THE CAPRICE, THE SELFISHNESS, AND THE HOSTILITY OF OTHER NATIONS COULD NOT AFFECT IT.** On this point, therefore, the committee cannot entertain any doubt. The extension of domestic manufactures, depending on the production of such raw materials as can be found in this country, must *increase the demand and consumption of those materials, and of course secure a new and ready market.*

As to the articles of foreign growth, to which an increase of duty should apply, in order to promote the prosperity of our agriculture, the committee need only remark, that, if the principles which they advance be sound, *the duty should embrace every raw material found or procured with ease and cheapness, and in abundance in the United States.* The committee have confined themselves to the home market, in the brief view which they have presented. The question how far the increase of this home market, by an increase of duty on foreign articles, would affect the demand of our agricultural products abroad, leads to a new train of considerations. The first inquiry which naturally occurs on this point is, what are the inducements with foreign nations to purchase the productions of our soil? what their motives? what the moving causes of the market which they extend? Is their policy founded on favour, reciprocity, self-interest, or necessity? On this subject, there is little ground for difference of opinion. FOREIGN NATIONS ACT NOT FOR US, BUT FOR THEMSELVES. FAVOUR, AND EVEN RECIPROCITY, FORM NO BASIS FOR THEIR MEASURES TOWARDS US BEYOND THE COMPASS OF BARE EXPEDIENCY. THEY WILL CONSUME OUR RAW MATERIALS WHEN THEY CANNOT DO BETTER; WHEN THEY CAN, THEY WILL NOT CONSUME THEM. When the consumption of our agricultural products comes in contact with any principle of political economy applicable to their own condition, *a hostile tariff meets us at their shores.* Hence, *the foreign market, for the fruits of our soil, depends but little on the sale which foreign manufactures find in this country:* and, whether we purchase more or less, foreign nations will graduate their policy towards us, by a standard independent of any general system of duties which we may adopt; at least, so it appears to your committee.

How long would Great Britain purchase our cotton, if her own colonies could supply her demands? How many nations would consume any article that is cultivated by the American agriculturist, if they could find their demand supplied on better and more advantageous conditions, by home industry? These questions are answered by their proposition; it is, therefore, the opinion of the committee, that *the foreign market for our agricultural products, and for the staple articles of our exports, in the shape of raw materials, will not be essentially affected by any increase of duty on those foreign manufactures which are composed of similar materials.*

As to the amount of duty which should be imposed, it must always depend upon a variety of considerations, which need not be detailed: *it should be sufficient to secure the exclusive and constant demand of our raw materials, and to sustain the American manufacturer in his pursuits; it must be competent to build up and protect those manufacturing establishments at present in the country, and which, with a reasonable encouragement, will present a constant demand for those raw materials.*

In fact, as to the articles of foreign growth or manufacture, which should be taxed in order to increase our agricultural prosperity, your committee would refer, generally, to the tariff now before the house. The committee do not perceive the necessity of selecting any articles, or of imposing any duties, beyond those embraced by that bill.

E.

The substance of Mr. Calhoun's speech, on Mr. Randolph's motion to strike out the minimum valuation on cotton goods, in April, 1816.

The debate heretofore on this subject, has been on the degree of protection which ought to be afforded to our cotton and woollen manufactures: all professing to be friendly to those infant establishments, and to be willing to extend to them adequate encouragement. The present motion assumes a new aspect. It is introduced professedly on the ground that manufactures ought not to receive any encouragement; and will, in its operation, leave our cotton establishments exposed to the competition of the cotton goods of the East Indies, which, it is acknowledged on all sides, they are not capable of meeting with success, without the protection contained in the proviso proposed to be stricken out by the motion now under discussion.

Till the debate assumed this new form, Mr. Calhoun said, he had determined to be silent; participating as he largely did, in that general anxiety which is felt, after so long and laborious a session, to return to the bosom of our families. But, on a subject of such vital importance, touching as it does the security and permanent prosperity of our country, he hoped that the House would indulge him in a few observations. He regretted much his want of preparation—he meant not a verbal preparation; for he had ever despised such; but that due and mature meditation and arrangement of thought, which the House is entitled to on the part of those who occupy any portion of its time. But whatever his arguments might want on that account in weight, he hoped might be made up in the disinterestedness of his situation.—He was no manufacturer. He was not from that portion of our country supposed to be peculiarly interested. Coming, as he did, from the South, having, in common with his immediate constituents, no interest, but in the cultivation of the soil, in selling its products high, and buying cheap the wants and conveniences of life, no motives could be attributed to him, but such as were disinterested.

He had asserted that the subject before them was connected with the security of the country. It would, doubtless, by some be considered a rash assertion; but he conceived it to be susceptible of the clearest proof; and he hoped, with due attention, to establish it to the satisfaction of the House.

The security of a country mainly depends on its spirit and its means; and the latter principally on its monied resources. Modified as the industry of this country now is, combined with our peculiar situation and want of a naval ascendancy, *whenever we have the misfortune to be involved in a war with a nation dominant on the ocean, and it is almost only with such we can at present be, the monied resources of the country, to a great extent must fail.* He took it for granted, that it was the duty of this body to adopt those measures of prudent foresight, which the event of war made necessary. We cannot, he presumed, be indifferent to dangers from abroad, unless, indeed, the House is prepared to indulge in the phantom of eternal peace, which seemed to possess the dreams of some of its members. Could such a state exist, no foresight or fortitude would be necessary to conduct the affairs of the republic; but as it is the mere illusion of the imagination, as every people that ever has or ever will exist, are subjected to the vicissitudes of peace and war—what then, let us consider, constitute the resources of this country, and what are the effects of war on them? Commerce and agriculture, till lately, almost the only, still constitute the principal sources of our wealth. So long as these remain uninterrupted, the country prospers: but war, as we are now circumstanced, is equally destructive to both. They both depend on foreign markets; and our country is placed, as it regards them, in a situation strictly insular. A wide ocean rolls between us and our markets. Our commerce neither is nor can be protected by the present means of the country. What, then, are the effects of a war with a maritime power—with England? *Our commerce annihilated, spreading individual misery, and producing national poverty; our agriculture cut off from its accustomed markets, the surplus product of the farmer perishes on his lands; and he ceases to produce, because he cannot sell.* His resources are dried up, while his expenses are greatly increased; as all manufactured articles, the necessities, as well as the conveniences of life, rise to an extravagant price. The recent war fell with peculiar pressure on the growers of cotton and tobacco, and other great staples of the country; and the same state of things will recur in the event of another, unless prevented by the foresight of this body. If the mere statement of facts did not carry conviction to every mind, as he conceives it is calculated to do, additional arguments might be drawn from the general nature of wealth. Neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce, taken separately, is the cause of wealth; *it flows from the three combined; and cannot exist without each.* The wealth of any single nation or individual, it is true, may not *immediately* be derived from the three; but it always presupposes the existence of the three sources, though derived immediately from one or two of them only. Taken in its most enlarged sense, without commerce industry would have no stimulus; *without manufactures, it would be without the means of production; and without agriculture, neither of the others could exist.* When separated entirely and permanently, they must perish. War, in this country, produces to a great ex-

tent, that separation; and hence, the great embarrassment which follows in its train. The failure of the wealth and resources of the nation necessarily involved the ruin of its finances and its currency. It is admitted, by the most strenuous advocates, on the other side, that no country ought to be dependent on another for its means of defence; that, at least, our musket and bayonet, our cannon and ball, ought to be domestic manufacture. But what, he asked, is more necessary to the defence of a country than its currency and finance? Circumstanced as our country is, can these stand the shock of war? Behold the effect of the late war on them. *When our manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will, UNDER THE FOSTERING CARE OF GOVERNMENT, we will no longer experience those evils.* The farmer will find a ready market for his surplus produce: and, what is almost of equal consequence, a certain and cheap supply of all his wants. His prosperity will diffuse itself to every class in the community; and instead of that languor of industry and individual distress now incident to a state of war and suspended commerce, the wealth and vigour of the community will not be materially impaired. The arm of government will be nerved. *Taxes, in the hour of danger, when essential to the independence of the nation, may be greatly increased. Loans, so uncertain and hazardous, may be less relied on; thus situated, the storm may beat without, but within all will be quiet and safe.* To give perfection to this state of things, it will be necessary to add, as soon as possible, *a system of internal improvements, and at least such an extension of our navy as will prevent the cutting off of our coasting trade.* The advantage of each is so striking, as not to require illustration, especially after the experience of the recent war. It is thus the resources of this government and people would be placed beyond the power of a foreign war materially to impair.

But it may be said, that the derangement then experienced, resulted not from the cause assigned, but from the errors or the weakness of the government. He admitted that many financial blunders were committed; for the subject was new to us; that the taxes were not laid sufficiently early, or to as great an extent as they ought to have been; and that the loans were in some instances injudiciously made. But he ventured to affirm, that had the greatest foresight and fortitude been exerted, the embarrassment would have been still very great; and that even under the best management, the total derangement which was actually experienced, could not have been postponed eighteen months, had the war so long continued. How could it be otherwise? A war, such as this country was then involved in, in a great measure dries up the resources of individuals, as he had already proved; and the resources of the government are no more than the aggregate of the surplus incomes of individuals called into action by a system of taxation.

It is certainly a great political evil, incident to the character of the industry of this country, that, however prosperous our situation when at peace, with uninterrupted commerce, and nothing then could exceed it; *the moment that we are involved in war, the whole is reversed. When resources are most needed; when indispensable to maintain the honour; yes, the very existence of the nation, then they desert us.* Our currency is also sure to experience the shock; and becomes so deranged as to prevent us from calling out fairly whatever of means is left to the country. The result of a war, in the present state of our naval power, is the blockade of our coast, and consequent destruction of our trade. The wants and habits of the country, founded on the use of foreign articles, must be gratified. Importation to a certain extent, continues, through the policy of the enemy, or unlawful traffic. The exportation of our bulky articles is prevented: the specie of the country is drawn off to pay the balance perpetually accumulating against us: and the final result is the total derangement of our currency.

To this distressing state of things there are two remedies, and only two; one in our power immediately, the other requiring much time and exertion; but both constituting, in his opinion, the essential policy of this country: he meant the Navy and DOMESTIC MANUFACTURES. By the former, we could open the way to our markets; by the latter *we bring them from beyond the ocean, and naturalize them in our own soil.* Had we the means of attaining an immediate naval ascendancy, he acknowledged that the policy recommended by this bill,

would be very questionable; but as it is not the fact—as it is a period remote, with every exertion, and will be probably more so, from that relaxation of exertion so natural in peace, when necessity is not felt, it became the duty of this house to resort, to a considerable extent, at least as far as is proposed, to the only remedy, **THE PROTECTION OF OUR MANUFACTURES**. But to this it has been objected, that the country is not prepared, and that the result of our premature exertion would be to bring distress on it without effecting the intended object. Were it so, however urgent the reasons in its favour, we ought to desist, as it is folly to oppose the laws of necessity. But he could not for a moment yield to the assertion; on the contrary, he firmly believed that *the country is prepared, even to maturity, for the introduction of manufactures*. We have abundance of resources, and things naturally tend at this moment in that direction. A prosperous commerce has poured an immense amount of commercial capital into the country. *This capital has, till lately, found occupation in commerce; but that state of the world which transferred it to this country, and gave it active employment has passed away, never to return. Where shall we now find full employment for our prodigious amount of tonnage? where markets for the numerous and abundant products of our country?* This great body of active capital, which, for the moment, has found sufficient employment in supplying our markets exhausted by the war, and the restrictive measures preceding it, must find a new direction; it will not be idle. *What channel can it take, but that of manufactures?* This, if things continue as they are, will be its direction. It will introduce a new era into our affairs, in many respects highly advantageous, and ought to be countenanced by the government. Besides, we have already surmounted the greatest difficulty that has ever been found in undertakings of this kind.

The cotton and woollen manufactures are not to be introduced—they are already introduced to a great extent; freeing us entirely from the hazards, and, in a great measure, the sacrifices experienced in giving the capital of the country a new direction. The restrictive measures and the war, though not intended for that purpose, have, by the necessary operation of things, turned a large amount of capital to this new branch of industry. He had often heard it said, both in and out of Congress, during the war, that this effect alone would indemnify the country for all its losses. So high was this tone of feeling, when the want of these establishments was practically felt, that he remembered at that time, when some question was agitated respecting the introduction of foreign goods, that many then opposed it on the grounds of injuring our manufactures. He then said, that war alone furnished sufficient stimulus, and perhaps too much, as it would make their growth unaturally rapid; but on the return of peace, it would then be time to show our affection for them.

He at that time did not expect *unopposed and aversion to the extent which is now seen*. But it will, no doubt, be said, if they are so far established, and if the situation of the country is so favourable to their growth, where is the necessity of affording them protection? *It is to put them beyond the reach of contingency.* Besides, capital is not yet, and cannot for some time, be adjusted to the new state of things. There is, in fact, from the operation of temporary causes, a great pressure on these establishments. They had extended so rapidly during the late war, that many, he feared, were without the requisite surplus capital, or skill to meet the present crisis. Should such prove to be the fact, it would give a setback, and *might, to a great extent, endanger their ultimate success. Should the present owners be ruined, and the workmen disperse and turn to other pursuits, the country would sustain a great loss.* Such would, no doubt, be the fact, to a considerable extent, if **THE MANUFACTURES WERE NOT PROTECTED**. Besides, circumstances, if we act with wisdom, are favourable to attract to our country much skill and industry. The country in Europe, (he meant France,) abounding in the most skilful workmen, is prostrated. It is to us, if wisely used, more valuable than the repeal of the Edict of Nantz was to England. She had the prudence to profit by it—let us not discover less political sagacity. *Afford to ingenuity and industry immediate and ample protection, and they will not fail to give a preference to this free and happy country.*

It has been objected to this bill, that it will injure our marine, and, consequent-

ly, impair our naval strength. How far it is fairly liable to this charge he was not prepared to say. He hoped and believed it would not, at least to any alarming extent, have that effect immediately; and he firmly believed that its lasting operation would be highly beneficial to our commerce. The trade to the East Indies would certainly be much affected; but it was stated in debate, that the whole of that trade employed but 6000 sailors. Whatever might be the loss in this, or other branches of our foreign commerce, he trusted it would be amply compensated in our coasting trade; a branch of navigation wholly in our own hands. It has at all times employed a great amount of tonnage, something more, he believed, than one-third of the whole; nor is it liable to the imputation thrown out by a member from North Carolina, (Mr. Gaston) that it produced inferior sailors. It required long and dangerous voyages; and if his information was correct, no branch of trade made better or more skilful seamen. The fact that it is wholly in our own hands, is a very important one, while every branch of our foreign trade must suffer from competition with other nations. *Other objections of a political character were made to the encouragement of manufactures.* It is said they destroy the moral and physical power of the people. This might formerly have been true to a considerable extent, before the perfection of machinery, and when the success of the manufactures depended on the minute subdivision of labour. At that time it required a large proportion of the population of a country to be engaged in them; and every minute subdivision of labour is undoubtedly unfavorable to the intellect; but the great perfection of machinery has in a considerable degree obviated these objections. In fact, it has been stated that the manufacturing districts in England furnish the greatest number of recruits to her army, and that as soldiers, they are not materially inferior to the rest of her population. It has been further asserted, that manufactures are the fruitful cause of pauperism; and England has been referred to as furnishing conclusive evidence of the fact. For his part, *he could conceive no such tendency in them, but the exact contrary, as they furnished new stimuli to industry, and means of subsistence to the labouring classes of the community.*

We ought not to look to the cotton and woollen establishments of Great Britain for the prodigious numbers of poor with which her population was disgraced. Causes much more efficient exist.—Her poor laws, and statutes regulating the price of labour, with her heavy taxes, were the real causes.—But, if it must be so—if the mere fact that England's manufacturing more than any other country, explained the cause of her having more beggars, it is just as reasonable to refer to the same cause her courage, spirit, and all her masculine virtues, in which she excels all other nations, with a single exception—he meant our own; we, without vanity, challenge a pre-eminence. Another objection had been made, which he must acknowledge was better founded, that capital employed in manufacturing produced a greater dependence on the part of the employed, than in commerce, navigation, and agriculture.—It is certainly an evil, and to be regretted; but he did not think it a decisive objection to the system, especially when it had incidental political advantages, which, in his opinion, were more than a counterpoise to it. **IT PRODUCED AN INTEREST STRICTLY AMERICAN, AS MUCH SO AS AGRICULTURE.** *In this it had the decided advantage of commerce or navigation; and the country will from it derive much advantage.* Again, it is calculated to bind together more closely our widely spread republic. It will greatly increase our mutual dependence and intercourse; and will, as a necessary consequence, **EXCITE AN INCREASED ATTENTION TO INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT,** *a subject every way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment of national strength, and the perfection of our political institutions.* He regarded the fact, that it would make the parts adhere more closely, that it would form a new and most powerful cement, far outweighing any political objections that might be urged against the system. In his opinion, the *liberty* and *union* of this country were inseparably united. That as the destruction of the latter would most certainly involve that of the former; so its maintenance will, with equal certainty, preserve it. He did not speak lightly. He had often and long revolved it in his mind; and he had critically examined

into the causes that destroyed the liberty of other states. None of them apply to us, or least with a force to alarm. The basis of our republic is too broad, and its structure too strong to be shaken by them. Its *extension* and *organization* will be found to afford effectual security against their operation; but let it be deeply impressed on the heart of this house and country, that *while they guarded against the old, they exposed us to a new and terrible danger—disunion.* THE SINGLE WORD COMPREHENDED ALMOST THE SUM OF OUR POLITICAL DANGERS; AND AGAINST IT WE OUGHT TO BE PERPETUALLY GUARDED.

THE END.



